United Nations S/2017/1088

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 December 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 18 December 2017 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, containing an account of the Committee's activities from 1 January to 31 December 2017. The report, which was approved by the Committee, is being submitted in accordance with the note by the President of the Security Council of 29 March 1995 (S/1995/234).

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Kairat **Umarov**
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions
751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

17-21658 (E) 291217

Please recycle

Report of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

I. Introduction

1. The present report of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea covers the period from 1 January to 31 December 2017.

2. The Bureau of the Committee consisted of Kairat Umarov (Kazakhstan) as Chair and the representatives of Egypt and Japan as Vice-Chairs.

II. Background

3. By its resolution 733 (1992), the Security Council imposed a general and complete arms embargo on Somalia, and by its resolution 751 (1992), the Council established a committee to oversee the implementation of the embargo. Subsequently, in its resolutions 1356 (2001), 1425 (2002), 1744 (2007), 1772 (2007), 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), 1916 (2010), 2060 (2012), 2093 (2013), 2111 (2013), 2142 (2014), 2182 (2014), 2244 (2015), 2317 (2016) and 2385 (2017), the Council introduced exemptions to and further defined the scope of the embargo.

4. By its resolution 1425 (2002), the Security Council established the Panel of Experts on Somalia, which was succeeded by the Monitoring Group established by its resolution 1519 (2003). By paragraphs 1, 2 and 7 of its resolution 1844 (2008), the Council imposed targeted measures (a travel ban, an asset freeze and a targeted arms embargo) on individuals and entities designated by the Committee. In the same resolution, the Council also introduced certain exemptions to those measures. In its resolution 2036 (2012), the Council imposed a ban on the direct or indirect import of charcoal from Somalia, whether or not the charcoal originated in Somalia. In its resolution 2093 (2013), the Council partially lifted the arms embargo for the development of the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia.

5. In its resolution 1907 (2009), the Security Council imposed a two-way arms embargo on Eritrea, as well as targeted measures (a travel ban, an asset freeze and a targeted arms embargo) on individuals and entities designated by the Committee. The Council expanded the mandate of the Committee to enable it to oversee the implementation of those measures. The Monitoring Group, the name of which was changed to the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, was mandated to monitor, investigate and report on the implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1907 (2009). In the same resolution, the Council also introduced certain exemptions to the targeted measures. On 5 December 2011, the Council adopted its resolution 2023 (2011), by which it expanded the restrictive measures concerning Eritrea in the areas of the "diaspora tax", the Eritrean mining sector and financial services.

6. In 2014, the Security Council renewed the partial lifting of the arms embargo for the development of the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia on two occasions: in resolution 2142 (2014), for a period of six months, and in resolution 2182 (2014), until 30 October 2015. In its resolution 2182 (2014), the Council authorized, for a period of 12 months, Member States acting nationally or through voluntary multinational naval partnerships, such as "combined maritime forces", to interdict charcoal and arms being transported in violation of the sanctions measures in Somali territorial waters and on the high seas off the coast of Somalia, extending to and including the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. The Council renewed the

partial lifting of the arms embargo for the development of the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia and the authorization for the maritime interdiction of arms and Somali charcoal in its resolutions 2244 (2015), 2317 (2016) and 2385 (2017), most recently until 15 November 2018.

7. The mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, consisting of eight experts, was last extended in resolution 2385 (2017), until 15 December 2018.

8. Further background information on the Somalia and Eritrea sanctions regimes can be found in the previous annual reports of the Committee.

III. Summary of the activities of the Committee

9. The Committee met four times in informal consultations, on 20 January, 21 April, 2 October and 13 October, in addition to conducting its work through written procedures. The Committee also held joint informal consultations on 30 June with the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities.

10. During the informal consultations held on 20 January, the Chair introduced to the Committee the newly appointed Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group. On 21 April, the Coordinator of the Monitoring Group provided the Group's midterm update to the Committee, in accordance with paragraph 40 of resolution 2317 (2016).

11. During the joint informal consultations of 30 June, the Committee received a briefing from the Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development on the threat of transnational terrorism in the region.

12. During the informal consultations held on 2 October, the Committee received a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator on the report submitted pursuant to paragraph 29 of Security Council resolution 2317 (2016) (S/2017/860).

13. During the informal consultations held on 13 October, the Committee heard a presentation by the Monitoring Group on its final reports on Somalia and Eritrea, submitted pursuant to paragraph 40 of Security Council resolution 2317 (2016), and discussed the recommendations contained therein. The Committee also heard from the delegations of Somalia and Eritrea.

14. On 13 April, 24 July and 7 November, the Chair presented to the Security Council the 120-day briefings on the work of the Committee, pursuant to paragraph 11 (g) of resolution 1844 (2008).

15. On 11 September 2017, the Chair convened a meeting between the Government of Eritrea and the Monitoring Group. The purpose of the meeting was to enable the Group to discuss its preliminary findings with the Government of Eritrea prior to the Group's submission of its final reports to the Committee and to provide the Government of Eritrea with an opportunity to respond to those findings.

16. The reports of the Federal Government of Somalia submitted to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2317 (2016) were circulated to the Committee on 30 March and 3 October, respectively.

17. The Committee sent 26 communications to 10 Member States and other stakeholders with reference to the implementation of the sanctions measures.

IV. Exemptions

18. Exemptions to the arms embargoes on Somalia and Eritrea are contained in paragraphs 7, 10 (g), 11 (a) and 12 of resolution 2111 (2013), paragraph 4 of resolution 2142 (2014) and paragraph 2 of resolution 2385 (2017). Further Council requirements related to the partial lifting of the arms embargo for the Federal Government of Somalia are contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 2142 (2014).

19. Exemptions to the asset freeze on Somalia are contained in paragraph 4 of resolution 1844 (2008)and those on Eritrea in paragraph 14 of resolution 1907 (2009).

20. Exemptions to the travel ban on Somalia are contained in paragraph 2 of resolution 1844 (2008)and those on Eritrea in paragraph 11 of resolution 1907 (2009).

21. The Committee received 14 notifications pursuant to paragraph 10 (g) of resolution 2111 (2013). The Committee also received 3 notifications pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 2317 (2016), 2 notifications pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 2142 (2014) and 2 communications pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 2142 (2014). Furthermore, the Committee approved 1 request pursuant to paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2111 (2013).

V. Sanctions list

22. The criteria for the designation of individuals and entities as subject to the travel ban, asset freeze and targeted arms embargo for the Somalia sanctions regime are set out in paragraph 8 of resolution 1844 (2008), paragraph 1 of resolution 2002 (2011), paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (2012), paragraphs 1 to 3 of resolution 2060 (2012) and paragraph 43 of resolution 2093 (2013). The criteria for the Eritrea sanctions regime are set out in paragraph 15 of resolution 1907 (2009). The procedures for requesting listing and delisting are described in the Committee's guidelines for the conduct of its work.

23. As at the end of the reporting period, there were 13 individuals and one entity on the sanctions list of the Committee pertaining to Somalia and no names on the sanctions list of the Committee pertaining to Eritrea.

VI. Monitoring Group

24. On 21 April, in accordance with paragraph 40 of Security Council resolution 2317 (2016), the Monitoring Group provided its comprehensive midterm update to the Committee. On 2 October, in accordance with the same paragraph, the Monitoring Group provided its final reports on Somalia and on Eritrea to the Committee, which were transmitted to the Council on 2 November and issued as documents of the Council (S/2017/924 and S/2017/925, respectively). In accordance with its mandate, the Group also provided monthly updates to the Committee.

25. On 21 December, following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2385 (2017), the Secretary-General appointed eight individuals to serve in the Monitoring Group, with expertise in arms (two experts), armed groups/maritime, armed groups, finance, humanitarian affairs, natural resources and regional issues (see S/2017/1116). The mandate of the Group expires on 15 December 2018.

26. The Monitoring Group conducted visits to Bahrain, Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, France, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kuwait, Qatar, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates,

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. In Somalia, members of the Group undertook visits to Baidoa, Bosaso, Gaalkacyo, Garoowe, Hargeysa, Kismaayo, Mogadishu and Qandala.

27. In pursuance of its mandate, the Monitoring Group, through the Secretariat, sent 134 letters to Member States, the Security Council, the Committee and international and national entities.

VII. Secretariat administrative and substantive support

28. The Security Council Affairs Division provided substantive and procedural support to the Chair and the members of the Committee. Advisory support was also provided to Member States to promote understanding of the sanctions regimes and facilitate the implementation of the sanctions measures. Induction briefings were also provided to incoming members of the Council to familiarize them with the specific issues relevant to the sanctions regimes.

29. To support the Committee in its recruitment of well-qualified experts to serve on sanctions monitoring groups, teams and panels, a note verbale was sent to all Member States on 11 December to request the nomination of qualified candidates for membership in the roster of experts. In addition, a note verbale was sent to all Member States on 16 August notifying them of upcoming vacancies in the Monitoring Group and providing information on recruitment timelines, areas of expertise and pertinent requirements.

30. The Division continued to provide support to the Monitoring Group, conducting an induction for newly appointed members and assisting in the preparation of the Group's midterm update submitted in April and its final reports submitted in October.

31. The Monitoring Group participated in the fifth annual inter-panel coordination workshop, held in New York on 5 and 6 December, organized by the Secretariat. On 7 and 8 December, the Division, in cooperation with United Nations system partners, conducted a workshop on investigative interview techniques for 10 experts from sanctions monitoring groups, teams and panels. Two members of the Monitoring Group participated in the workshop.

32. The Secretariat continued to update and maintain the Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List and the Committee-specific sanctions lists in the six official languages and the three technical formats. Furthermore, the Secretariat implemented improvements concerning the effective utilization of and access to sanctions lists, including through the creation of links within list entries, as appropriate, to INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices, as well as the development in English of the data model approved in 2011 by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 48 of resolution 2253 (2015).

United Nations S/2017/1089

Security Council

Distr.: General
21 December 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 21 December 2017 from the Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa for 2017, as endorsed by the members of the Working Group.

I would be grateful if the present letter and the report could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Tekeda **Alemu**
Chair
Ad Hoc Working Group
on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa

17-23106 (E) 030118

Please recycle

Report on the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa for 2017

I. Introduction

1. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa is a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, established pursuant to the statement by the President of the Security Council of 31 January 2002 (S/PRST/2002/2), in which the Council recognized the need for adequate measures to prevent and resolve conflicts in Africa and indicated its intention to consider the establishment of an ad hoc working group to monitor the recommendations contained in the statement and to enhance coordination with the Economic and Social Council.

2. The present report of the Working Group covers the period from 1 January to 31 December 2017. The Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations, Tekeda Alemu, was appointed Chair of the Working Group for a one-year period ending 31 December 2017. The Permanent Representative of Senegal, Fodé Seck, served as Vice-Chair throughout the reporting period.

II. Activities of the Working Group in 2017

3. On 23 February 2017, the Working Group met to consider its activities for 2017 as proposed by the Chair. The members agreed to the provisional programme of work proposed by the Chair.

4. On 26 April 2017, the Working Group held a joint meeting with the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations on the topic "Building synergies for peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Africa: how can the United Nations and the African Union and its regional mechanisms enhance their strategic partnership?" Briefings were given at the joint session, which was the first of its kind, by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Taye-Brook Zerihoun; the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, El-Ghassim Wane; the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, Cho Tae-yul; and the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations, Tete António.

5. The members of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations were also invited to attend the joint meeting, which was co-chaired by the Permanent Representative of Senegal as Chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, and the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia as Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group. The format of the meeting was considered to be innovative and believed to contribute to the improvement of the working methods of the Security Council. Among the issues raised were the need to enhance the partnership with the African Union on a range of peace and security issues, the importance of strengthening the relationship between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, and stronger engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission on African issues.

6. On 12 July 2017, the Working Group considered the topic "Silencing the guns in Africa: challenges and prospects of creating a continent free of conflict". Briefers at this meeting were the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations, Macharia Kamau; the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations, Olof Skoog; the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; and the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations. The discussion allowed members of the Working Group to explore ways and means of strengthening the United Nations-African Union partnership to address emerging peace and security

threats on the African continent. The participants in the discussion emphasized the need to effectively utilize the range of frameworks and tools available in both organizations for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. In this respect, they also highlighted the importance of the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, the implementation of the master road map of the African Union on practical steps to silence the guns in Africa and the operationalization of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture, as well as the need to link peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Africa.

7. On 8 August 2017, the Working Group began consideration of how it could assist the Security Council in preparing for the eleventh annual joint consultative meeting of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, held in Addis Ababa on 8 September 2017, which was preceded by the informal meeting held in Addis Ababa on 7 September 2017. On 25 August 2017, the Working Group met to further discuss preparatory matters related to the joint consultative meeting.

8. This was the first stand-alone visit by the Security Council to the African Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa. During the joint consultative meeting, the two Councils exchanged views on the situation in Somalia, the situation in South Sudan and the situation in the Lake Chad Basin region. Prior to the joint consultative meeting, the members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held an informal joint meeting and exchanged views on the partnership between the African Union and the United Nations, funding for African Union peace and security activities, and post-conflict peacebuilding.

III. Conclusions

9. The Working Group has served as a useful forum for preparations and exchanges on the joint consultative meetings and other joint activities of the members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Moreover, in paragraph 18 of its resolution 2033 (2012), the Security Council decided to follow up on the communiques of the annual consultative meetings of the two Councils, including through the Working Group. In that connection, the Chair recommends that the Working Group should continue to exercise that mandate.

10. The Chair recalls that several members had suggested that the Working Group include country-specific discussions on its programme of work, which might make the Working Group more operational. In that connection, the Chair recommends that the Working Group consider including country-specific issues on its programme of work for 2018.

United Nations S/2017/1090

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 December 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 20 December 2017 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, containing an account of the Committee's activities from 1 January to 31 December 2017. The report, which was approved by the Committee, is being submitted in accordance with the note by the President of the Security Council of 29 March 1995 (S/1995/234).

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Chair
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013)
concerning the Central African Republic

17-21733 (E) 291217

Please recycle

Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic

I. Introduction

1. The present report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic covers the period from 1 January to 31 December 2017.

2. The Bureau of the Committee consisted of Volodymyr Yelchenko (Ukraine) as Chair and the representative of Japan as Vice-Chair.

II. Background

3. By its resolution 2127 (2013), the Security Council imposed a general and complete arms embargo on the Central African Republic and established a committee. The Committee is tasked with, among other things, overseeing the implementation of the sanctions measures. By the same resolution, the Council established a panel of experts working under the direction of the Committee.

4. Subsequently, by its resolution 2134 (2014), the Security Council imposed additional measures, such as a travel ban and an asset freeze on individuals and entities designated by the Committee in accordance with the listing criteria delineated in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the resolution. Both resolutions contain exemptions to the measures and criteria for designation.

5. The Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic consists of five experts. Its mandate was extended most recently in resolution 2339 (2017).

6. Further background information on the Central African Republic sanctions regime can be found in the previous annual reports of the Committee.

III. Summary of the activities of the Committee

7. The Committee held one formal meeting, on 25 January, and met six times in informal consultations, on 17 February, 31 March, 12 May, 21 July, 4 December and 29 December, and held its first open briefing to Member States on 6 September, in addition to conducting its work through written procedures.

8. During the formal meeting, held on 25 January, the Committee met representatives of the permanent missions of the Central African Republic and nine States of the region, namely, Cameroon, Chad, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, the Sudan and Uganda, as well as the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts, who participated through videoconference, to discuss the final report of the Panel (S/2016/1032) and the challenges faced by the participating Member States in monitoring and implementing the sanctions measures.

9. During the informal consultations held on 17 February, the Committee heard a presentation by the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on the Panel's progress update, submitted in accordance with paragraph 23 (d) of resolution 2262 (2016), on the Panel's activities since the presentation of its final report for 2016 to the Committee in December 2016.

10. During the informal consultations held on 31 March, the Committee heard a presentation by the Panel of Experts on its programme of work.

11. During the informal consultations held on 12 May, the Committee heard a presentation by the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on the Panel's progress update, submitted in accordance with paragraph 28 (d) of resolution 2339 (2017), on the Panel's activities since the presentation of its previous progress update. The Committee also received a briefing by the Mine Action Service on its role in support of the Central African Republic in weapons stockpile and ammunition management.

12. During the informal consultations held on 21 July, the Committee heard a presentation by the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on the Panel's midterm report (S/2017/639 and S/2017/639/Corr.1), submitted pursuant to paragraph 28 (c) of resolution 2339 (2017), and discussed the recommendations contained therein.

13. On 6 September, the Committee held the first open briefing since its establishment on the midterm report of the Panel of Experts and on the national implementation of sanctions measures by States in the region.

14. During the informal consultations held on 4 December, the Committee received a presentation by the Panel of Experts on its final report (S/2017/1023), submitted pursuant to paragraph 28 (c) of resolution 2339 (2017), and discussed the recommendations contained therein. The Committee also received a briefing by the Mine Action Service and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on weapons and ammunition management in the Central African Republic.

15. Following the above-mentioned formal meeting and informal consultations, and in accordance with paragraph 104 of the annex to the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507), the Committee issued press releases containing brief summaries of the formal meeting and informal consultations.

16. On 20 March, the Committee revised and adopted its guidelines for the conduct of its work.

17. On 11 August, the Committee issued a note verbale to all Member States relating to the obligations of Member States to submit to the Committee, in advance, exemption requests and notifications in connection with the arms embargo, pursuant to a recommendation by the Panel of Experts in paragraph 127 (d) of its midterm report (S/2017/639 and S/2017/639/Corr.1).

18. On 15 February, the Chair of the Committee briefed the Security Council on the activities of the Committee, pursuant to paragraph 37 of resolution 2339 (2017) (see S/PV.7884).

19. In 2017, the Committee received implementation reports from three Member States.

20. The Committee sent 102 communications to 21 Member States and other stakeholders with reference to the implementation of the sanctions measures.

IV. Exemptions

21. Exemptions to the arms embargo are contained in paragraph 1 of resolution 2339 (2017).

22. Exemptions to the asset freeze are contained in paragraphs 13 to 15 of resolution 2339 (2017).

23. Exemptions to the travel ban are contained in paragraph 10 of resolution 2339 (2017).

24. The Committee received and approved one arms embargo exemption request pursuant to paragraph 1 (d) of resolution 2339 (2017), six arms embargo exemption

requests pursuant to paragraph 1 (b) of resolution 2339 (2017) and eight arms embargo exemption requests pursuant to paragraph 1 (g) of resolution 2339 (2017). The Committee received 20 arms embargo notifications pursuant to paragraph 1 (b) of resolution 2339 (2017), on which no negative decision was taken. The Committee also received three post-facto arms embargo notifications pursuant to paragraph 1 (b) of resolution 2339 (2017), on which no negative decision was taken.

V. Sanctions list

25. The criteria for the designation of individuals and entities as subject to the travel ban and asset freeze are set out in paragraphs 11, 16 and 17 of resolution 2339 (2017). The procedures for requesting listing and delisting are described in the Committee's guidelines for the conduct of its work.

26. On 17 May, the Committee listed one individual subject to the measures imposed in paragraph 5 (travel ban) and paragraph 12 (asset freeze) of resolution 2339 (2017).

27. On 20 December 2016, the Committee received, through the Government of the Central African Republic, a delisting request on behalf of an entity on its sanctions list, on which a negative decision was taken on 28 July 2017. On 20 November 2017, the Committee received, through the Government of the Central African Republic, a delisting request on behalf of an entity on its sanctions list, on which no decision has yet been taken.

28. As at the end of the reporting period, there were 11 individuals and two entities on the sanctions list of the Committee.

VI. Panel of Experts

29. On 8 February, in accordance with paragraph 23 (d) of resolution 2262 (2016), the Panel of Experts provided a progress update to the Committee on information obtained during the Panel's visits to the Central African Republic following the presentation of its final report for 2016 (S/2016/1032) to the Committee on 2 December 2016.

30. On 6 March, following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2339 (2017) on 27 January, the Secretary-General appointed five individuals to serve on the Panel, with expertise in finance and natural resources, regional issues, arms, armed groups and humanitarian issues (see S/2017/194). The mandate of the Panel expires on 28 February 2018.

31. On 3 May, in accordance with paragraph 28 (d) of resolution 2339 (2017), the Panel provided a progress update to the Committee.

32. On 6 July, in accordance with paragraph 28 (c) of resolution 2339 (2017), the Panel provided its midterm report to the Committee (S/2017/639 and S/2017/639/Corr.1), which was transmitted to the Security Council on 26 August and issued as a document of the Council.

33. On 13 November, in accordance with paragraph 28 (c) of resolution 2339 (2017), the Panel provided its final report to the Committee (S/2017/1023), which was transmitted to the Security Council on 20 December and issued as a document of the Council.

34. On 29 November, in accordance with paragraph 28 (f) of resolution 2339 (2017), the Panel provided five statements of case, together with supporting evidence, for five

individuals that, in the Panel's view, met the listing criteria delineated in paragraphs 16 and 17 of resolution 2339 (2017). Statements of case for two of the five individuals were updates from original statements of case submitted in 2014.

35. The Panel conducted visits to Belgium, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Arab Emirates and the United States of America.

36. Since 1 January, in pursuance of its mandate, the Panel has, through the Secretariat, sent 89 letters to Member States, the Committee and international and national entities.

VII. Secretariat administrative and substantive support

37. The Security Council Affairs Division provided substantive and procedural support to the Chair and the members of the Committee. Advisory support was also provided to Member States to promote understanding of the sanctions regime and facilitate the implementation of the sanctions measures. Induction briefings were also provided to incoming members of the Council to familiarize them with the specific issues relevant to the sanctions regime.

38. To support the Committee in its recruitment of well-qualified experts to serve on sanctions monitoring groups, teams and panels, a note verbale was sent to all Member States on 11 December to request the nomination of qualified candidates for membership in the roster of experts. In addition, a note verbale was sent to all Member States on 20 October notifying them of upcoming vacancies on the Panel of Experts and providing information on recruitment timelines, areas of expertise and pertinent requirements.

39. The Division continued to provide support to the Panel of Experts, conducting an induction for newly appointed members and assisting in the preparation of the Panel's midterm report submitted in July and its final report submitted in November.

40. The Panel of Experts participated in the fifth annual inter-panel coordination workshop, held in New York on 5 and 6 December, organized by the Secretariat. On 7 and 8 December, the Division, in cooperation with United Nations system partners, conducted a workshop on investigative interview techniques for 10 experts from sanctions monitoring groups, teams and panels. One member of the Panel participated therein.

41. The Secretariat continued to update and maintain the Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List and the Committee-specific sanctions lists in the six official languages and the three technical formats. Furthermore, the Secretariat implemented improvements concerning the effective utilization of and access to sanctions lists, including through the creation of links within list entries, as appropriate, to INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices, as well as the development in English of the data model approved in 2011 by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 48 of resolution 2253 (2015).

42. Pursuant to paragraph 29 of resolution 2339 (2017), the Secretary-General submitted his report on options for benchmarks to assess the arms embargo measures according to progress made in security sector reform in the Central African Republic (S/2017/597).

United Nations S/2017/1091

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 December 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 22 December 2017 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the mandate of which was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2360 (2017), have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 6 of the resolution, the midterm report on their work.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 28 November 2017 and was considered by the Committee on 11 December 2017.

The Group would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Zobel **Behalal**
Coordinator
Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(*Signed*) Ledio **Cakaj**
Expert

(*Signed*) Virginie **Monchy**
Expert

(*Signed*) Roberto **Sollazzo**
Expert

(*Signed*) Bart **Vanthomme**
Expert

(*Signed*) David **Zounmenou**
Expert

17-21115 (E) 271217

Please recycle

Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Summary

Since the issuance of the previous report of the Group of Experts on 16 August 2017 (S/2017/672/Rev.1), the overall security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has remained volatile. While the level of violence in the Kasai provinces has declined, instability remains. The Group noted an increased activity of armed groups in the Kivu provinces. The political situation remained tense owing the failure to organize the general elections that had initially been scheduled for 2016. The recent publication of a new calendar for the elections has not appeased tensions between the Government and some opposition groups.

While still presenting a threat, the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) continued to be weakened. FDLR maintained alliances with Congolese armed groups and continued to generate revenues by selling charcoal and wooden planks produced inside Virunga National Park. The Group also observed a continued decline of the Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie (CNRD). CNRD clashes with FDLR have decreased, even though CNRD has been involved in several incidents with local armed groups.

The Allied Democratic Forces continued to recruit from Uganda. The Group documented instances of recruitment similar to those in its previous findings.

Local armed groups cited in the present report continued to represent a major threat to security. The Group received information that some local armed groups were coalescing into larger groups and that, in general, such groups had increased their areas of control and generated income through the taxation of local population and kidnapping for ransom.

Regarding the exploitation of natural resources, the Group documented the attempted smuggling of tin, tantalum and tungsten involving an officer from the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo, as well as breaches of the tin, tantalum and tungsten mineral traceability system. While the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported that it had taken action in relation to the disappearance of 50 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region export certificates from its national stock, it has yet to provide information on the whereabouts of most of the certificates.

The Group documented a lack of communication on the implementation of the asset freeze between the Banque centrale du Congo and banks operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law remained widespread in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In Beni and Lubero territories, the Group documented attacks against peacekeepers, which are sanctionable acts under paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 2360 (2017). The Group found that gang rapes constituted a component of the conflict between the Bantu and Twa communities in Tanganyika Province. The Group also noted that six persons suspected in the murder of two members of the Group, Zaida Catalán and Michael Sharp, in March 2017 remained at large. The Group remains concerned that the security of current members of the Group remains at risk as long as all those suspected in the murder are not investigated and brought to justice for the brutal killing of its former colleagues.

The Group documented instances of arms embargo violations, focusing on arms transfer networks from Burundi to armed groups in the Ruzizi Plain. The Group also found that the diversion of weapons from the national security forces to armed groups continued.

The Group has included in the present report proposals to improve cooperation between the Democratic Republic of the Congo, other States members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the United Arab Emirates to combat gold smuggling from member States of the International Conference to Dubai. On the basis of its findings, the Group also recommends that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo improve the security of its armouries, ensure that banks implement United Nations sanctions and investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of gang rapes in Tanganyika Province.

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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing

I. Introduction

1. From 16 to 19 October 2017, the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Amr Abdellatif Aboulatta (Egypt), visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo and the United Arab Emirates. The Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo notes with appreciation the support provided to its work by the Chair during that visit and the Chair's visit in August 2016.

2. In accordance with the request made by the Security Council in paragraph 8 of its resolution 2360 (2017), the Group continued to exchange information with the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic.

Cooperation with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

3. The Group expresses its gratitude for the valuable support and collaboration of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) during the period under review.

Compliance with the Group's requests for information

4. Following its appointment by the Secretary-General on 4 August 2017 (see S/2017/683), the Group addressed 14 official communications to Member States, international organizations and private entities during the first part of its mandate. In its final report, the Group intends to provide a full accounting of the replies received.

Methodology

5. The Group used the evidentiary standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). The Group based its findings on documents and, wherever possible, on first-hand on-site observations by the experts themselves. When this was not possible, the Group corroborated information by using at least three independent and reliable sources.

6. Given the nature of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there are few documents that provide definitive proof of arms transfers, recruitment, command responsibility for grave abuses of human rights and the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The Group has therefore relied on eyewitness testimony from members of local communities, former combatants and current members of armed groups. The Group has also considered the expert testimony of government officials and military officers from the Great Lakes region and United Nations sources.

7. The present report covers investigations up to 10 November 2017. Investigations relevant to the Group's mandate that were conducted thereafter will be reflected in the final report.

Attacks against peacekeepers

8. The Group notes with concern attacks by armed elements against peacekeepers. At least three separate attacks in September and October 2017 in Beni and Lubero territories left two peacekeepers dead and two injured. The Group recalls that planning, directing, sponsoring or participating in attacks against peacekeepers or United Nations personnel, including members of the Group of Experts, are sanctionable acts under paragraph 3 of resolution 2360 (2017). The Group will

continue its investigations into the perpetrators of those attacks and present its findings in its final report.

Implementation of the Group's recommendations from its previous report

9. In its report of August 2017, the Group made four recommendations to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and two recommendations to the Security Council (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, paras. 181 and 182). The Group notes that, in pursuance of one of its recommendations, the Banque centrale du Congo has initiated a process with international and regional organizations to harmonize the country's legal framework and financial practices with international and regional anti-money-laundering standards and define an action plan on sanctions compliance.

10. Nevertheless, the Group is concerned that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has not addressed most of the recommendations made in its previous report. In October 2017, during a meeting with the Group, a senior government official questioned the relevance of the recommendations as well the authority of the Security Council to advise the Government.

11. The Group welcomes the statement by the President of the Security Council of 7 November 2017 (S/PRST/2017/23) on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which echoed a number of the Group's recommendations mentioned above. However, the Group notes that its recommendation for the establishment of an independent international investigation into the murder of Zaida Catalán and Michael Sharp was not considered. Nevertheless, the Group intends to work closely with the team appointed by the Secretary-General to assist with the national investigation into the killing of the two experts and the four Congolese nationals accompanying them, as set out in the Secretary-General's letter to the President of the Security Council dated 31 October 2017 (S/2017/917).

12. Following the statement by the President of the Security Council, the Group commenced working with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Civil Aviation Organization on concrete guidelines to assist airlines in their efforts to prevent the transport of gold smuggled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in cabin luggage. The Group intends to consult a larger number of relevant stakeholders and submit its proposed guidelines in its final report.

II. Armed groups

A. Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda

13. The Group continued its investigations into the activities of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) (CDe.005),[1] a sanctioned entity active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2000. Weakened in 2016 by Sukola II operations led by the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) (see S/2016/466, paras. 10–15) and the breakaway of the Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie (CNRD) (see S/2016/1102, paras. 10–13), FDLR continued to decline owing to defections and the almost complete lack of any new recruitment. However, the armed group has maintained alliances with Congolese armed groups and generated revenues by selling locally charcoal and wooden planks, which are mainly produced inside Virunga National Park.

[1] Unless otherwise specified, "Forces democratiques de liberation du Rwanda" (FDLR) refers to FDLR-Forces combattantes abacunguzi, as opposed to any other splinter groups, such as the Rassemblement pour l'unité et la démocratie or FDLR-Soki.

Ongoing operations and defections

14. On 27 September 2017, MONUSCO and FARDC launched the joint military operation "Phoenix Rising" against FDLR south of Nyanzale, in Rutshuru territory. The operation pushed many FDLR combatants into Virunga National Park. It is unclear whether it resulted in defections from the armed group, but the Group noted that a large number of combatants surrendered after the operation began. In late September 2017, 52 FDLR combatants and dependants surrendered to MONUSCO and were repatriated to Rwanda on 3 October 2017. The Group requested permission from the Government of Rwanda to interview the returnees but has yet to receive a response.

Organization and use of children

15. FDLR is mainly present in Bwito chefferie, Rutshuru territory, where Sylvestre Mudacumura (CDi.012) (also known as Bernard Mupenzi), an FDLR commander, is based. Gaston Iyamuremye (CDi.003) (also known as Byiringiro Victor Rumuli, Victor Rumuri, Michel Byiringiro, Victor Byiringiro and Rumuli), the FDLR political commissar and Mr. Mudacumura's deputy, is stationed in the area south-east of the town of Mweso and north-west of the Nyamulagira volcano. The Group has received estimates ranging from 400 to 600 for the number of FDLR combatants, who reportedly include children.

16. The Group spoke to a 15-year-old Congolese boy who claimed to have been part of an FDLR unit for more than two years. He stated that there were two other Congolese children in his group. Three other former FDLR combatants, two of whom were Rwandan, stated that there were Congolese children in their respective FDLR units. At least one such group led by a Captain Acize and located in the vicinity of the Nyamulagira volcano had five Congolese children in its ranks. The recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a sanctionable act under paragraph 7 (d) of Security Council resolution 2293 (2016), as reaffirmed in paragraph 2 of resolution 2360 (2017).

Local interactions

17. The Group observed that FDLR had continued to collaborate with local armed groups[1] and civilian populations, as previously reported (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, paras. 16 and 17) and confirmed by interviews with four former combatants in October 2017. FDLR units continued to conduct operations with Nyatura Domi and Groupe de securite led by Kasongo Kalamo. Mr. Kalamo's group, situated near Mweso, in Masisi territory, attacked CNRD positions in October 2017. A former FDLR combatant described having been captured by Mr. Kalamo's group at the end of September 2017 and threatened with death on suspicion of being CNRD. He was released only after hours of interrogations and after having substantiated his FDLR affiliation with Kasongo personally.

18. Apart from collaborating with local armed groups, FDLR commanders use Congolese nationals to generate income. Two young Congolese men described to the Group how they manned checkpoints in the south-west of Virunga National Park. In those posts, they taxed the local population for access to their own land. A third man described selling livestock on behalf of an FDLR group, which yielded $50 a week. The money was paid to the FDLR group commander. Other Congolese nationals were also involved in various types of small commerce on behalf of FDLR commanders.

[1] In the present report, "local armed groups" refers to Mai-Mai or Nyatura factions.

Such activities included selling used clothes and charcoal, as well as providing FDLR groups with weekly income.

External support

19. The Group had previously reported how the websites intabaza.com, umucunguzi.com (Radio Umucunguzi), urugaga.org and rwacu.org (the Rwandan cultural society or RCS) promoted the ideology and the activities of FDLR and provided opportunities for fundraising via the PayPal account of RCS. The Group found that those websites were hosted in the Netherlands and registered by Ignace Ntirushwamaboko (also known as Darius "Sunray" Murinzi), an individual residing in Canada. Mr. Ntirushwamaboko is the North American representative of the Front commun pour la liberation du Rwanda, a coalition to which FDLR belongs (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, paras. 24 and 25, and annex 13).

20. The Government of the Netherlands informed the Group in writing that its judicial authorities had opened an investigation into the matter, noting, however, that it was not allowed to share any additional information regarding the investigation at the current stage.

21. The Government of Canada informed the Group that it had transmitted the Group's request for information to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which is responsible for investigating possible violations of sanctions legislation and regulations. The Government also informed the Group that it could not order Canadian banks to disclose financial information about Mr. Ntirushwamaboko, as he was not a sanctioned individual to whom reporting obligations would apply.

22. The Group transmitted a new request for information to the PayPal company but had not received a response at the time of reporting.

B. Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie

23. The Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie (CNRD) is a foreign armed group operating in the Kivu provinces since its split from FDLR in May 2016 (see S/2016/1102, para. 23, and S/2017/672/Rev.1, paras. 33–36). The Group investigated the presence of CNRD in North Kivu and observed a continued weakening of the group owing to ongoing defections and difficulties in recruiting new combatants. The Group noted several clashes with local armed groups and observed a decrease in fighting between CNRD and FDLR, which marked a change in the behaviour reported previously (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 19).

Leadership, location and recruitment

24. The overall leader of CNRD remained "Colonel" Laurent Ndagijimana (also known as Lumbago or Wilson Irategeka). The military commander of the North Kivu section was "Colonel" Antoine Hakizimana (also known as Colonel Jeva). CNRD headquarters are situated in Faringa, a hilltop in Bwito chefferie, and its units are located in the hills west of Nyanzalé, north of Mweso, south of Kikuku and east of Mpati (see annex 1).

25. Most CNRD troops were divided into five sectors with approximately 50 combatants each. From testimonies of former combatants, the Group estimates the actual strength of the North Kivu section of CNRD to be around 250 to 300 combatants. The recruitment of new combatants declined during the period under review. Seven former combatants told the Group that no training of recruits had taken place since April 2017. The Group was informed that a few Congolese elements had also joined CNRD, primarily in search of economic opportunities.

26. CNRD continued to generate income through the production of charcoal and wooden planks. The armed group did not tax the local population as systematically as other groups in the region (see paras. 63-72 below).

Incidents between the Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie and other armed groups

27. The Group had previously reported the resumption of fighting between FDLR and CNRD in April 2017 (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 19). These clashes were short-lived. Since May 2017, no fighting has been reported between the two groups. Four former combatants told the Group that CNRD avoided clashes with FDLR and withdrew before confrontations could occur. At the same time, relations between the two groups remained tense, and all the former CNRD members who were interviewed stated that they would be killed if they returned to FDLR.

28. In October 2017, CNRD clashed with the armed groups Nyatura Kasongo and Nyatura Jean-Marie in the Kashuga-Mpati region. The fighting resulted in the deaths of several civilians and the displacement of the local population. The same month, CNRD also clashed with the Nduma défense du Congo-Renové (NDC-R) in the north of its area of control.

C. Continuous recruitment by the Allied Democratic Forces

29. The Group found that the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) had continued to use deception and false promises to lure poor young people from Uganda into the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where they were forced to join the armed group.

30. The Group interviewed two Ugandan men who had been approached by a recruiter, who was later arrested in Uganda, with promises of a scholarship and the opportunity to manage a farm in Butembo, in North Kivu Province. The two had been stopped in July 2017 at the Congolese-Ugandan border as they were attempting to cross with fake Congolese electoral cards provided by the recruiter. Their stories were similar to those of four other Ugandans interviewed by the Group who had been similarly misled by ADF recruiters. One recruit had remained with ADF for close to three years, while the other three had stayed for short periods, ranging from a few hours to a few days. The Group notes that this is consistent with previous findings (see S/2015/19, paras. 16–24, and S/2016/1102, para. 40).

D. Local armed groups in North Kivu Province

31. The Group investigated the activities of local armed groups in Rutshuru and Lubero territories, observing a general increase in the areas that those armed groups controlled (see annex 1).

Nyatura John Love

32. The Group confirmed that, as previously reported (see S/2016/1102, paras. 48–50), Muhawenimana Bunombe (also known as "Colonel" John Love) remained the leader of a group of Nyatura combatants. John Love told the Group that he was under the command of Ndaruhutse Kamanzi (also known as "General" Domi) and that they were part of a larger armed group called Collectif des mouvements pour le changement (see annex 2).

33. The armed group Nyatura John Love operates fairly autonomously in its zone of control, which is situated between the villages of Nyanzale, Ngoroba and Kikuku in Bwito chefferie. Its leader controls approximately 200 combatants spread over two

units under the command of "Major" Ping and "Major" Ndabitegereshe. Approximately half of the combatants are equipped with AK-47-type rifles. Five combatants and officers told the Group that they had obtained most of their ammunition from local FARDC soldiers in exchange for food or money.

34. In addition to attacking FARDC, Nyatura John Love clashed with Mai-Mai Mazembe.[1] From early September 2017, the two armed groups engaged in killing civilians and burning houses in each other's area of control. The attacks intensified in the second half of October 2017 when Mai-Mai Mazembe killed three civilians in Bambo. In retaliation, Nyatura John Love burned dozens of houses in Kishishi and, in turn, Mai-Mai Mazembe burned houses in Kikuku. This prompted new attacks on Mirangi, Kikuku and Katolo by Nyatura, which caused the displacement of the population.

Mai-Mai Mazembe

35. The Group investigated a faction of Mai-Mai Mazembe that maintains a significant area of influence in Bwito and Bamate chefferies and is led by "General" Muhindo Kitete Bushu. From 2015 to May 2017, Mai-Mai Mazembe fought alongside NDC-R against FDLR. However, current and former combatants said that the two armed groups fell out following a dispute in May 2017 between Kitete and "General" Guidon Shimiray Mwissa, the leader of NDC-R. An NDC-R attack in July 2017 forced Kitete to move his headquarters from Kiambuli to Butolera.

36. Several combatants told the Group that Kitete recruited combatants among the local Nande population, who often received rudimentary military training and were hurriedly deployed to fight other armed groups. Most of their weaponry was acquired in the aftermath of clashes with FDLR, yet ammunition was chronically in short supply. Two former combatants informed the Group that the spouses of FARDC soldiers sold ammunition to Mai-Mai Mazembe.

37. During the reporting period, Kitete's men clashed with Nyatura John Love near Bwalanda, in Nyanzalé, and NDC-R in Miriki. The Miriki region has become hotly contested, with the two groups frequently clashing to assume control of taxation of the local population (see para. 69 below), causing internal displacement and ongoing strife. Attacks north of Nyanzalé have also caused displacement. For example, on 4 October 2017, the Group witnessed the arrival of 30 families from Somikivu (north-west of Nyanzalé) to Kihondo, near Nyanzalé, following threats by Kitete against the local communities.

Mai-Mai Charles/Mai-Mai Jackson

38. During the period under review, the Group investigated the Alliance des forces armées de résistants patriotes Mai-Mai, also known as Mai-Mai Charles. The armed group is named after its leader Charles "Bokande" Mwandibwa and is based in Bwisha chefferie, Rutshuru territory. Mai-Mai Charles is one of the largest Mai-Mai groups in the region and is known to carry out attacks against FARDC soldiers and impose taxes on local farmers and fishermen.

39. Mai-Mai Charles started with an estimated 40 men in late 2014, growing to 150 elements by mid-2015 (see S/2016/466, para. 82). Sources reported that, by mid-2017, Mai-Mai Charles armed elements numbered close to 300. The majority of its members carry weapons including AK-47-type rifles, PKM machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG-7) and at least one 60 mm mortar.

[1] Unless otherwise specified, "Mai-Mai Mazembe" refers to the faction led by "General" Muhindo Kitete Bushu.

40. The current movement inherited some combatants from previous Mai-Mai groups in the region, notably Mai-Mai Shetani. A former prominent Mai-Mai leader and a colonel in FARDC, Jackson Muhukambuto Paluku, deserted his army post and joined Bokande in February 2017. This prompted some former combatants to refer to the group as Mai-Mai Jackson.

41. Separated in a few mobile units, the group is deployed in the Binza groupment in Rutshuru. Most units operate inside Virunga National Park, to the south of Lake Edward, with a small presence in Chanika, south-west of the lake, in Lubero territory. Former combatants stated that Kafunzo was considered as the group's headquarters. Other positions include Tshondo, Kamuroro-Birwa and other areas around Nyakakoma on the south-eastern shore of Lake Edward, west of the Ugandan border.

42. Colonel Jackson's arrival prompted a reorganization of the group. Four former combatants reported a division of labour between the armed elements and the civil administration, with the latter focusing entirely on the collection of taxes and the management of the funds thus levied. They also reported punishments being carried out for insubordination and indiscipline.

43. As previously reported, commanders Bokande and Jetaime Masimbi have been reported as having recruited children (see S/2016/466, para. 82). Three former combatants told the Group that the recruitment of children had significantly declined around March 2017, after Colonel Jackson's arrival. One stated that at least one child, who reportedly carried the group's "dawa",[4] remained in the group.

44. Three former Mai-Mai Charles members stated that Colonel Jackson was in favour of conducting attacks against FARDC, which the armed group had not done before the Colonel assumed command. An FARDC senior officer based in Rutshuru told the Group that Colonel Jackson, whom he had known personally during their time in FARDC, had attacked FARDC positions in Ishasha, Nyamilima and Vitshumbi in 2017. A Mai-Mai Charles attack against FARDC on 14 August 2017 in Buholu, near Lake Edward, in Rutshuru, caused the death of more than 35 soldiers.

45. Bokande has continued to publicly propagate a pro-Nande, anti-Rwanda stance and managed to control natural resources in parts of Virunga National Park as well as taxation on illegal fishing in Lake Edward (see para. 70 below).

III. Natural resources and finance

A. Tin, tantalum and tungsten

46. The Group documented two cases of breach of the mineral supply chain in the mining areas around Rubaya. Those incidents were also reported via the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative, the only operational due diligence system for tin, tantalum and tungsten in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

47. On 2 August 2017, an FARDC major serving in the Commission nationale de lutte contre la fraude minière (National Commission against Mining Fraud), was arrested at a checkpoint roadblock in Sake with 580 kg of untagged coltan in a Land Cruiser bearing licence plate number 7858AC19. The untagged minerals had been hidden inside the vehicle in bays created between the lower plank and the chassis, similar to those used by other smugglers (see S/2017/762/Rev.1, para. 86) (see annex 3). The minerals were contained in bags commonly used for the transport of legal minerals from Rubaya (see annex 4). The Group will continue to investigate

[4] The potion which is purported to render combatants invincible.

whether that was an isolated case or part of a wider smuggling network and will keep the Committee informed.

48. On 4 October 2017, 50 to 70 elements of the armed group Nyatura under "General" Delta Kashamare stormed Rubaya without meeting any resistance from the local Congolese national police. They spent the night in town before being chased away the following day by an FARDC intervention. The Group intends to report further on whether Nyatura had any legal claim related to mining operations in Rubaya.

49. Mining authorities in North Kivu told the Group that, following the incident in Rubaya, they were exploring mitigation mechanisms to prevent such incursions in future. The Group notes that the presence of armed groups in mining sites constitutes a major breach of the traceability chain as well as a violation of resolution 2360 (2017). The Group sent a request to ITRI, which manages the Tin Supply Chain Initiative, to obtain clarification on the aforementioned incidents and it looks forward to receiving a reply.

B. Gold

50. This section is an update of previous investigations by the Group into the use of stolen International Conference on the Great Lakes Region certificates to export gold from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group also explores herein areas for improved cooperation between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Arab Emirates to combat illegal trade in gold.

Misuse of International Conference on the Great Lakes Region export certificates

51. The Group had previously reported the disappearance of 50 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region certificates from the national stock of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, paras. 113-117). Subsequently, the Group received a report from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo acknowledging the disappearance and describing efforts to address the issue.

52. A Government official expressed the view that the Government had improved the security measures at the premises where the certificates were stored. The Government also provided the Group with copies of arrest warrants issued against staff of the Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de certification des substances minérales précieuses et semi-précieuses (Centre for the Evaluation, Appraisal and Certification of Precious and Semi-Precious Mineral Substances), the national entity in charge of the management of the certificates.

53. The Government also informed the Group that it had filed a complaint against Kambala Kasuyi Kennedy, a businessman suspected of being the main exporter of gold. Mr. Kambala had used one of the stolen certificates, which bore reference CD00007976 (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 114).

54. The Group welcomes the actions taken so far by the Government but notes that the Government has failed to explain what has happened to the other 49 missing certificates. The Group is not aware of any initiatives by the Government to inform international buyers about the stolen certificates. The Group remains concerned that the certificates may have been or could be used to export gold illegally.

55. The Committee also forwarded to the Group a separate report from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in which it was alleged that MONUSCO staff had forged and sold gold export certificates. The Group obtained two such certificates: one from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the

Congo and the other from a second source. Following investigations into the matter, the Group believes that the certificates were fraudulent.

56. The certificates contained what appear to be obvious errors. They bore the name of "Mrs. Margaret Ogata", who allegedly worked for MONUSCO. In response to the Group's query for further information, MONUSCO stated that no such person had ever worked for the Mission. MONUSCO informed the Group that the second alleged staff member, "Gen. Chander PR Kash", whose name appeared on the second certificate, could probably refer to Lieutenant General Chander Prakash, who served from 2010 to 2013 as the Mission's Force Commander. The Group notes that the signature attributed to "Gen. Chander" on the certificate was different from that used by Lieutenant General Chander during his tenure as Force Commander (see annex 5).

Gold smuggled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Dubai

57. Civil society organizations, mining administration in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and gold traders from Butembo, Bukavu and Uvira told the Group that a large part of gold artisanally sourced in the country continued to be smuggled to Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

58. As previously reported (see S/2015/19, para. 210, S/2016/466, para. 166, and S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 131), loopholes in the control system in Dubai facilitate the smuggling of gold from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. For example, in October 2017, the Group interviewed two witnesses who had seen smugglers carrying gold from the Democratic Republic of the Congo pass through Dubai airport using export documents misrepresenting the origin of their gold. During a meeting in Dubai on 20 October 2017 (as part of the Committee Chair's visit), officials of the United Arab Emirates informed the Group that they had encountered difficulties authenticating documentation used to export gold from States members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to Dubai.

Areas of improvement for cooperation between the United Arab Emirates and member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

59. The Group has underlined the need to improve cooperation among the secretariat of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Arab Emirates with a view to combatting gold smuggling (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 132). During the aforementioned meeting of 20 October, the authorities of the United Arab Emirates requested proposals from the Group on how such cooperation could be materialized.

60. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and other member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region already have legislation that lists the requirements, including the necessary documents, for the export of gold. The Group notes that the authorities of the United Arab Emirates were not always aware of such requirements and documents. The Group also notes that the United Arab Emirates and the 12 member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region[*] should systematically know what those requirements and documents are. The appointment of national focal points in the United Arab Emirates, the member States of the Conference and the secretariat of the Conference with the mandate to inform each party of the status of relevant legislation could facilitate the exchange of information.

61. The United Arab Emirates and the member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region should also develop a joint system for

[*] Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia.

authenticating the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region certificates required to export gold from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Customs agents in Dubai and the other emirates should be able to readily contact a focal point in any of the 12 member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to check whether confidential information on a certificate is genuine.

62. The Group is also of the view that the United Arab Emirates should make any sale of gold by traders based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to Dubai-based traders conditional upon the seller being authorized as an official International Conference on the Great Lakes Region exporter. In coordination with countries from the region, the authorities could create and maintain a database of official exporters (also known as "comptoirs" in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), together with a list of individuals officially employed by licensed exporters for the individual transport of gold.

C. Illegal taxation by armed groups

63. The Group had previously reported that FDLR and Nyatura groups levied money and in-kind taxes on populations in areas under their control (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 22). The Group's current investigations in Bwito-Bwisha, Bashali and Bamate chefferies have revealed that illegal taxation generates revenues for every armed group active in the region. Armed groups deliver tokens, locally called "jetons", to the population as proof of payment of taxes (see annex 6).

Nyatura groups

64. The Group observed that Nyatura armed groups under Domi, John Love, Kasongo and Ntibi impose taxes, locally called "lala salama" (i.e., "sleep quietly") and "rengera buzima" (i.e., "protect your life"). In Rutshuru territory, those groups collect taxes between the Mweso and Nyanzalé areas. Nyatura leaders have dedicated elements who collect weekly taxes from the population. They also pressure traditional authorities or civil society representatives into collecting taxation money on their behalf (see annex 7).

65. Nyatura Kasongo imposes a "rengera buzima" tax of 2,500–3,000 Congolese francs[6] per month per household. Several sources said that Kasongo's decision to tax every adult instead of entire households had provoked popular protests in Mweso in September 2017. Some families had abandoned their homes and fields in fear of being unable to pay the tax.

66. In the Nyanzalé area, John Love and some of his tax collectors informed the Group that they had levied a tax of 1,000 Congolese francs per month on 8,000 families to allow them access to their fields, thus earning 8 million Congolese francs per month. "General" Domi taxed $6 per month per cow grazing in the lands that he controlled and also imposed a tax of $5 per harvest per family (there are three to four harvests a year) to allow farming.

67. Nyatura groups sent written requests to the population demanding the payment of taxes. For example, on 9 September and 2 October 2017, Nyatura Ntibi in Muhanga sent signed letters demanding from 14 landowners from the Hunde community in the area that they pay taxes to have access to their fields (see annex 8).

[6] On 18 November 2017, the official exchange rate was 1,570 Congolese francs to 1 United States dollar.

Mai-Mai groups

68. In parts of Lubero territory, Mai-Mai Mazembe taxes roughly 10,000 farmers a rate of 1,000 Congolese francs per person per month, thus earning 10 million Congolese francs per month overall. Several Mazembe tax collectors in Kanyatsi and Butalongola informed the Group that they had collected a monthly tax at roadblocks on the roads used by farmers to reach their fields, each roadblock being manned by one armed and one unarmed element. Several sources informed the Group that Mai-Mai Mazembe would arrest them if they were found without the jeton for the month and would request 11,000 Congolese francs for their release.

69. The Group estimates that the amount of taxes that Mai-Mai Mazembe collected in the Miriki area yielded on average 4 million Congolese francs per month. In July and September 2017, Mai-Mai Mazembe temporarily lost control of Miriki to NDC-R. As a consequence, the population in Miriki had to pay taxes twice, to Mazembe and to NDC-R.

70. The Group found that Mai-Mai Charles taxed fishermen involved in illegal fishing on Lake Edward to protect them from Congolese security forces and Virunga National Park rangers. A Mai-Mai Charles tax collector informed the Group that the amounts levied varied from 10,000 to 60,000 Congolese francs per week, depending on the size of the fishing boat, the ability to fish at night and the use of fishing nets. Mai-Mai Charles collected taxes from about 40 fishermen in Chanika every week, registered in a logbook maintained by their secretary, "Maj" Kakule Serge, based in Chanika. The Group estimates that this system could yield up to 9.6 million Congolese francs per month.

71. The Group documented 25 cases in September 2017 in which the armed group Mai-Mai Charles had kidnapped fishermen who had refused to pay tax and had demanded a ransom for their release. Furthermore, former Mai-Mai Charles combatants stated that they taxed farmers between 1,000 and 5,000 Congolese francs for passage to their lands, as well as a percentage of their harvests in kind.

72. The Group investigated NDC-R taxing people in gold mining areas under their control. The jetons obtained by the Group showed a superior level of organization compared with other armed groups (see annex 9).

D. Challenges in implementing the financial sanctions

73. In its previous report (see S/2017/762/Rev.1, para. 8), the Group observed a general lack of proper communication and procedures concerning United Nations sanctions, in particular from the central bank and national bank regulator, the Banque centrale du Congo, in its dealings with local banking institutions.

74. The Group found that no legislation existed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo requesting bank customers to provide proof of origin of the funds used in financial transactions and that the existing legislation, which limits unregistered cash transactions to $10,000, was not implemented. Those two factors prevent the national regulator and the banking system from verifying whether cash transactions emanate from the assets of individuals and entities under United Nations sanctions. That lack of control is further aggravated by the fact that only 20 per cent of financial transactions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are channelled through the official banking system, which enables the circulation of large amounts of unrecorded cash in Congolese francs and United States dollars.

75. The Association congolaise des banques (Congolese Banking Association) informed the Group that banks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo relied almost

exclusively on the sanctions list issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the United States of America, and not on the Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List[5] for the names of sanctioned individuals and entities. The Group stresses that, while the Office of Foreign Assets Control list includes individuals and entities sanctioned by the United Nations, the burden of implementation rests on instructions received from the national regulator.[6]

IV. Serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights

A. Conflict-related sexual violence in Tanganyika

76. The Group investigated the commission of acts of sexual violence related to the resurgence of the conflict between Twa and Bantu communities in Tanganyika Province. The Group found that Twa and Bantu militias committed gang rapes, which is a component of the conflict. Acts of sexual violence also included instances of sexual slavery by Twa militias. Gang rapes and sexual slavery are sanctionable acts under paragraph 2 of resolution 2360 (2017).

Resurgence and context of the conflict

77. Since mid-July 2016, the conflict between Twa and Bantu communities has continued with violence rapidly spreading to most of Tanganyika Province. As in other areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, civilians bear the brunt of the violence, with many serious human rights violations being committed. The conflict caused massive internal displacement of civilians within the province. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in October 2017, 557,000 persons were internally displaced inside Tanganyika,[7] approximately 20 per cent of the estimated overall population. This displacement has led to an acute humanitarian crisis. The long-standing marginalization and discrimination suffered by the Twa community (see S/2015/19, annex 33) remain valid.

Sexual violence as a component of the conflict

78. Several sources, including victims of rapes, told the Group that both Twa and Bantu militias had gang-raped women and girls of all ages belonging to, or perceived to be part of, the other community. The Group also uncovered cases of Twa militias using members of the Bantu community as sexual slaves and gang-raping men. The gang rapes had taken place in various locations of Tanganyika Province since at least September 2016 and, for most victims interviewed by the Group, in Kalemie territory between November 2016 and August 2017.

79. Most victims were unable to identify their assailants beyond specifying the communities that they belonged to. For that reason, but also because of time, security and logistical constraints affecting the Group's investigations as well as the very nature of those militias, the Group could not establish the identity of the perpetrators. While some names of community leaders have surfaced, the evidence is insufficient

[5] See www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/un-sc-consolidated-list. The Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List includes the names of all individuals and entities subject to sanction measures imposed by the Security Council, including those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo list, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions list and other lists.

[6] See www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_compliance.aspx#start.

[7] *Note d'informations humanitaires* of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 3 October 2017, available from www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/ocha_tanganyika_note_informations_humanitaires_03102017.pdf.

to link them to the rapes. Bantu militias are usually known as "elements", and Twa militias as "perci", an abbreviation of "personnel civil" (civilian personnel). Those groups use weapons such as arrows and bows, machetes, knives and axes. They also practice spiritual rituals that they claim make them invincible. The evidence gathered suggests that those militias do not have a unified structure, but rather that militiamen from each side operate in separate groups. Several sources informed the Group of alliances of such separate groups from different areas in Tanganyika Province during attacks, as well as of some forms of coordination and organization already existing within the militias. The Group can therefore not exclude that those militias may become more structured and escalate violence further.

80. The Group found that the rapes usually followed a pattern of women being trapped and gang-raped by militiamen. Thirteen women interviewed by the Group had each been raped by two to six militiamen. The Group was informed that other women had been raped by as many as 15 men. Several raped women witnessed the gang rapes of other women who were with them. One of the victims witnessed the rape of her mother by six militiamen, and another the rape of her daughters aged 11 and 14 by three militiamen. Gang rapes typically took place during attacks on villages by militiamen or while the women were busy with their daily activities, such as working in the fields. The people who committed those gang rapes targeted women, including pregnant women, of all ages, as most were 15 to 55 years of age. Girls as young as 3, 7, 11 and 14 have also been sexually assaulted.

81. Militiamen targeted women because they belonged or were perceived to belong to another community. Victims therefore originate from both the Bantu and the Twa communities, but also from other communities living and assimilated with the targeted community. The evidence gathered showed that the majority of the identified rape victims belonged or were perceived to belong to the Bantu community. However, the Group cannot exclude underreporting from Twa women, owing notably to the discrimination that they are subjected to, which results in limited access to social and health services.

82. Twa militias have also gang-raped men, though not on the same scale as Bantu women. For instance, the Group interviewed a 55-year-old Twa man who had been raped by two Twa militiamen for refusing to join them in the fight against Bantu militias. A source also informed the Group that Twa militiamen had gang-raped Bantu men because the Bantu women had managed to escape.

83. In some cases, Twa militiamen have kidnapped and used members of the Bantu community as sexual slaves and for work during several months. For instance, the Group interviewed two Bantu girls, one 15 years of age, who had been kidnapped together with three other Bantu girls by Twa militiamen following an attack on their village and who had been used as sexual slaves for about five months.

84. The Group is aware that the prosecutorial and judicial authorities of Tanganyika Province have initiated investigations into several of those conflict-related gang-rape cases, including for crimes against humanity when said authorities had considered that the constitutive elements of such crimes were met. The Group welcomes those investigations and will follow up on their outcomes.

B. Update on the investigation into the murder of two members of the Group of Experts

85. Since its previous report (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, paras. 171–173), the Group has continued to monitor the investigation into the murder on 12 March 2017 of Zaida Catalán and Michael Sharp, two members of the Group of Experts.

86. The Group welcomes the appointment of a United Nations team of experts mandated to assist the ongoing investigations and trial in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in connection with the Secretary-General's letter dated 15 August 2017 transmitting the executive summary of the report of the Board of Inquiry to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/713). In his letter, the Secretary-General expressed his intention to discuss with officials of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and consult with Council members regarding the establishment of a follow-on mechanism and its mandate. The Group also welcomes the Secretary-General's remarks in his letter dated 31 October 2017 to the President of the Security Council that the Senior Official appointed to lead the mechanism would report to the Secretary-General on a regular basis (S/2017/917).

87. A source involved in the investigation told the Group that six remaining suspects of the eight who had been identified on the video recording of the murder remained at large, even though they could be arrested.

88. An investigative report by an international press outlet[10] revealed an audiotape dated 11 March 2017 that the Group had retrieved and reviewed in March 2017 (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 169). As reported by the press, the Group shares the view expressed in the investigative report that the interpreter had deliberately misled the two experts on the security situation in Bunkonde. This suggests that the murder was planned.

V. Arms and ammunition

89. The Group investigated instances of arms embargo violations during the reporting period. It focused on arms transfer networks from neighbouring countries to armed groups in the Ruzizi Plain. The Group also focused on the diversion of weapons and ammunition from the FARDC stock to armed groups. The Group's preliminary findings revealed that the transfer of weapons and ammunition as well as diversions to armed groups active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued in violations of the arms embargo.

A. Update on arms trafficking networks in the Ruzizi Plain

90. The Group followed up on its previous investigations into the transfer of weapons and ammunition in the Ruzizi Plain (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, paras. 152 and 153).

91. Witnesses informed the Group that, in early September 2017, four bags containing two AK-47-type rifles each, disassembled among cassava plants, had been delivered to Mai-Mai Bigaya. Three bags and three medium-sized boxes of ammunition had also been delivered towards the end of the same month. Between 14 and 16 October 2017, Mai-Mai Bigaya received one PKM machine gun, 25 AK-47-type rifles and 15,000 rounds of ammunition at Rukobero, near Sange, Uvira territory.

92. Several sources alleged that those weapons and ammunition had been brought from Burundi via the Ruzizi River. They also informed the Group that the arms transfer network was renewing itself with some new actors. In its previous report, the Group had identified an individual named Manassé Hakizimana as one of the leaders of the network (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 152) The Group received confirmation that, following the death of Mr. Hakizimana in March 2017, Ndayizeye Jean de Dieu,

[10] www.rfi.fr/afrique/20170913-experts-onu-tues-rdc-enregistrement-suggere-piste-guet-apens.

also known as Jadeau or Jadot (ibid., para. 153), had taken on the leading role in the arms trafficking networks between Burundi and the Ruzizi Plain.

93. In response to a request from the Group, the Government of Burundi denied that members of the Forces de défense nationale (FDN), the Burundian national army, were involved in sending arms to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government also denied involvement of FDN troops in cross-border attacks on anti-Burundian government forces active in the Ruzizi Plain. The Government informed the Group that Burundian armed groups active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo included the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL)-Nzabampema and renegade soldiers who had deserted the national army and wore FDN uniforms to create confusion.

94. The Group will continue its investigations and present its findings to the Committee in its final report.

B. Looting of weapons and ammunition from the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo in Bendera

95. The Group gathered information that, on 1 June 2017, a group of Mai-Mai Yakutumba elements attacked the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) base in Bendera, north of Tanganyika Province, and looted the armoury. One witness who had been forced to transport looted materiel told the Group that, early in the morning of that day, close to 80 Mai-Mai Yakutumba elements had attacked the camp and abducted local residents. The attackers had then forced him and others to carry the looted weapons and ammunition, including eight mortars, six PKM machine guns, a large number of rocket-propelled grenades, 22 boxes of ammunition and close to 40 AK-47-type rifles to the shores of Tinbie River, around 2 km from Bendera.

96. Most of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba elements were armed with AK-47-type rifles, two were carrying RPG-7s and two had PKM machine guns and a lot of ammunition. After the attack, the Mai-Mai Yakutumba assailants left the Bendera base at around 6 a.m. with their abductees and looted military materiel. They subsequently met with another group of abductees coming from South Kivu, bringing the total of those carrying weapons and ammunition to almost a hundred.

97. Recurrent attacks on FARDC positions to loot weapons and ammunition form part of a pattern by armed groups to acquire and increase their military capacity. The Group had previously observed and reported on the poor conditions of the armouries and storage facilities across the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see S/2016/1102, para. 115). Such conditions make the armouries vulnerable to attacks by armed groups for the purpose of seizing weapons and ammunitions. The Group believes that recurrent attacks on FARDC storage facilities to loot weapons and ammunitions warrant further investigation.

C. Diversion of weapons from national security forces

98. The Group consulted the military court registry and identified 13 cases related to the sales of weapons and ammunition by national security forces to armed groups that were pending before the court in North Kivu in 2017. A senior FARDC officer told the Group that this number was far below the trends that he had observed within the national security forces.

99. The Group interviewed Baraka Simandugu, a Congolese police officer who had sold an AK-47 assault rifle and ammunition to a Nyatura Domi element in the Mugote

refugee camp on 11 September 2017. Mr. Simandugu told the Group that he had been sent by FARDC Colonel Magellan to deliver an AK-47 assault rifle with ammunition to an individual in Kitchanga. In exchange for the weapon, Mr. Simandugu had received 80,000 Congolese francs. He had returned the money to Colonel Magellan who had paid him a commission of 20,000 Congolese francs. Other witnesses identified the buyer as Major Jovani, a member of Nyatura Domi.

VI. Recommendations

100. The Group makes the recommendations set out below.

Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

101. The Group recommends that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo:

(a) Inform international buyers of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region export certificates stolen from its national stock, which may have been or could be used to export gold illegally (see paras. 50–54 above);

(b) Establish a proof of origin system for all financial transactions, including deposit, withdrawal and wire transfer, above $10,000 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see para. 74 above);

(c) Ensure that banks operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo enforce the asset freeze imposed by the Committee on 31 individuals and nine entities (see para. 75 above);

(d) Investigate direct and indirect perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence in Tanganyika Province, their support networks and motivations, and prosecute them (see paras. 78–84 above);

(e) Improve the security of FARDC armouries in accordance with international standards (see paras. 95–97 above).

Member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the United Arab Emirates

102. The Group recommends that the member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the United Arab Emirates address the Group's proposals to combat gold smuggling from the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to Dubai and inform the Committee accordingly (see paras. 59–62 above).

Annexes

Annex 1: Major armed groups in the *Petit Nord*

The map below indicates zones of influence (not necessarily in full or constant control) of the eight strongest armed groups in northern Masisi, Rutshuru and Walikale territories: FDLR, CNRD, *Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain* (APCLS), Nyatura Kasongo, Nyatura Domi, Mai Mai Mazembe Kitete, Mai Mai Charles and NDC-R in October 2017.



(Map by the United Nations, as edited by the Group of Experts)

Annex 2: *Collectif des mouvements pour le changement* (CMC)

The Collectif des mouvements pour le changement (CMC) promotes itself as a political movement that aims to unite armed groups in North and South Kivu. Its objectives are to force President Joseph Kabila to stand down and reduce what it perceives as Rwandan influence in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The president of the movement is Athanase Murundura, also known as Baobab, who allegedly resides in a neighbouring country. The spokesperson of the group is Jean-Claude Habyarimana Mbitse, also known as Jules Mulumba, who is located in the vicinity of Mweso, likely under the protection of Nyatura Kasongo.

CMC members claim to have already united several armed groups. Nyatura Domi, Nyatura Kasongo and the APCLS are the most important alleged CMC allies in North Kivu, and negotiations with Nyatura Kavumbi are said to be ongoing. In South Kivu, several Raia Mutomboki factions are reportedly part of the CMC also. The armed wing of CMC is called *Forces de Défense du Peuple* (FDP), but there have been no reported attacks attributed to the FDP so far. Most of the affiliated armed groups still operate under their own group name.

In July 2017, 13 CMC members were arrested in Bujumbura on an alleged mission seeking support from Burundian officials. However, Burundian security services arrested and transferred them to the Congolese authorities. They are in custody in Kinshasa.

Annex 3: Attempted smuggling of 580 Kg of coltan in Sake



The Group obtained the photos from a source in August 2017

Annex 4: Bags used to officially transport minerals from Rubaya

Photo by the Group in October 2017

Annex 5: Reply from MONUSCO to the allegation of gold smuggling by its staff


Incohérence #1 : La MONUSCO n'affiche jamais le drapeau de la RDC dans ses documents officiels
Incohérence #2 : La MONUSCO n'affiche jamais ce modèle de sceau dans ses documents officiels
United Nations
Nations Unies
MONUSCO
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)
Incohérence #3 : la MONUSCO n'affiche jamais le nom de la RDC de la façon dont il est affiché dans ce document
Incohérence #4 : La MONUSCO n'octroie aucun "Certificat de Propriété", de quelque nature que ce soit
Incohérence #5 : La MONUSCO n'est pas impliquée dans la certification de la traçabilité des minerais
Incohérence #6 : La soi-disant autorité qui signe le certificat "Gen. Chander Pr. Kash" n'existe pas (voir page suivante pour des détails supplémentaires)
1

Le document sous examen est visiblement un faux. Il contient une signature attribuée à un certain "Gen. Chander Pr. Kash", et aurait été signé le 14 Juin 2017.
Il sied de signaler la similarité de ce nom, avec celui de l'ancien Commandant de la Force de la MONUSCO, le Lieutenant General Chander Prakash (qui a exercé cette fonction entre 2010 et 2013).



Echantillon de la signature du faux document, prétendument signé par l'autorité de la MONUSCO "Gen. Chander Pr. Kash" le 14 juin

Echantillon de la signature authentique du Lieutenant General Chander Prakash, MONUSCO, Commandant de la Force de la MONUSCO pour la période 2010-2013


Inconsistency #7
"MONUSCO "Watch"
does not exist
Inconsistency #8
MONUSCO does not
feature etched seals on
its official papers
UNITED NATIONS SIMPLIFIED COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE
001923
Possible consistency #1
East Africa Cargo Handlers (see
page # 4 & 5 for details)
Possible consistency #2
Danny Sole nsers (see page
#6 for details)
Inconsistency #9 There
is no record of a
Margaret Ogata as
MONUSCO staff
(confirmed by MONUSCO
Human Resources)
Inconsistency #11 MONUSCO
MONUSCO does not feature
holographic seals on its official
papers
Inconsistency #10
"Security and Safety
Section (S&SS) " does not
exist as the UN

Annex 6: Tokens (*jetons*) provided by armed groups as proof of payment of illegal taxes

(collected by the Group between September and October 2017)

Nyatura Kasongo *jeton*

Nyatura John Love *jeton*



Nyatura Domi *jeton*

Mai Mai Mazembe *jeton*



Mr. Gedeon Kasereka in Butolera is the Mai Mai Mazembe Kitete element in charge of producing the *jetons*: 40 *jetons* are cut from each page of a normal notebook, rubber-stamped and then distributed to the tax collectors.

NDC-R *jeton* delivered to Miriki in July 2017

In July and September 2017, Mai Mai Mazembe Kitete temporary lost control of Miriki to NDC-R. As a consequence, the population in Miriki had to pay taxes twice, first to Mai Mai Mazembe Kitete and subsequently to NDC-R.

NDC-R commander *Tondeuse* planned to collect taxes from the population on 15 October 2017, but this was foiled by the intervention of MONUSCO which deployed IndBatt from Kanyabayonga to Miriki on 13 October 2017.

Mai Mai Charles *jeton* to illegal fishermen on Lake Edward

Annex 7: Text message sent by a Nyatura leader to coerce an individual not affiliated with the armed group to collect taxes on his behalf



Translation: Have you got the parts [taxation money]? I'm counting on you

Photo taken and translation (Swahili to English) by the Group of Experts

Annex 8: Written request by Nyatura Ntibi demanding money to landowners from Muhanga

Document sent by Muhanga village chief denouncing displacement and destruction of fields by armed groups and to which the request signed by armed group leader Ntibi was attached



RE PUBLIQUE DE MOCRATIQUE DU CONGO

CHEFFERIE DES BASHALI
GROUPEMENT DES BAMUKOTO
VILLAGE MUHANGA

Route Muhanga-Kitshanga, le 25/09/2017

N° 5072/005/VILL-MUH/2017

Transmis copie pour information à :

- Monsieur le Chef de la Chefferie des BASHALI à ***KITSHANGA***
- Monsieur le Président de la Société Civile de la Chefferie des BASHALI à ***KITSHANGA***
- Monsieur le Chef de Village KITSHANGA à ***KITSHANGA***

567/N.51
03-10-2017

Objet **Statistique de la population Deplacée de Village MUHANGA à KITSHANGA**

A Monsieur le Chef de Groupement des BAMUKOTO à ***KITSHANGA***

Monsieur le Chef de Groupement.

Par la présente, j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre en annexe de la présente la statistique de la population déplacée de Village MUHANGA à KITSHANGA, pendant les affrontements entre les groupes armés NYATURA (groupe de securité et l'APCLS.

Je n'oublie pas de vous informer que cette population déplacée est aussi victime de destruction méchante des plantes surtout vivrières, pillage des récoltes, demolition des maisons d'habitation, Bureaux, Écoles ainsi que privation au libre circulation et exploitation de leurs champs. Voir note de témoignage en annexe aussi.

Je vous en souhaite bonne réception.

Le Chef de Village MUHANGA

BALUME LUBANGO

STATISTIQUE DE LA POPULATION DÉPLACÉE DE

VILLAGE MUHANGA à KITSHANGA

1) Colline MUHANGA	: 304 ménages
2) Colline KITOBO	: 217 ménages
3) Colline LUBULA	: 158 ménages
4) Colline KAUTU/RUKENGE	: 136 ménages
5) Colline MUTANGA	: 173 ménages
6) Colline BUXOHA	: 116 ménages
7) Colline NGINGWE	: 341 ménages
8) Colline BUCHALWICHI	: 159 ménages
9) Colline NGIRANGANO	: 63 ménages
	: 1 667 ménages

VILLAGE LUPFUNDA

1) Colline KYEKIRE	: 161 ménages
2) Colline KIUSHA	: 48 ménages
	: 209 ménages

Total : 1 667 + 209	*: 1 876 ménages*

Annex 9: NDC-R *jetons* and rubber stamps seized on Mr. Mudekereza

On 21 September 2017, the *Agence Nationale de Renseignements* in Kitumba arrested Mr. Mudekereza Bisimwa Robert, an alleged NDC-R element, and found on him 1,500 *jetons* for the month of September 2017 and two rubber stamps, one with the logo and title of NDC-R and one with the name of a certain 'Col' Deo Bafosse 'Chief of staff'. Mr. Mudekereza informed the Group that NDC-R intended to use these *jetons* — each with a face value of 5,000 Congolese Francs — in one of the mining areas under the armed group's control in Oninga, west of Kitumba in Walikale territory. Compared to other *jetons* the Group reviewed, the NDC-R *jetons* show professional editing and printing, which appear to confirm the group's better organization. The Group is continuing to gather elements on NDC-R activities in the mining and trade of gold in areas under its control in Walikale territory.

Rubber stamps with NDC-R logo and mention of "Col Deo Bafosse"

Electoral card of Mudekereza Bisimwa Robert

One of the 10 sheets where NDC-R *jetons* were printed



United Nations S/2017/1092

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 December 2017

Original: English

United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), resolution 2270 (2016), resolution 2321 (2016), resolution 2356 (2017), resolution 2371 (2017), resolution 2375 (2017), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7), 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13), and 29 August 2017 (S/PRST/2017/16),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Expressing its gravest concern at the ballistic missile launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("the DPRK") on 28 November 2017 in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), and 2375 (2017) and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT") and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community, including the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare, inherent dignity, and rights of people in the DPRK, and *expressing great concern* that the DPRK continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by diverting critically needed resources away from the people in the DPRK at tremendous cost when they have great unmet needs,

Acknowledging that the proceeds of the DPRK's trade in sectoral goods, including but not limited to coal, iron, iron ore, lead, lead ore, textiles, seafood, gold, silver, rare earth minerals, and other prohibited metals, as well as the revenue generated from DPRK workers overseas, among others, contribute to the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs,

Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK's ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have destabilized the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under Article 41,

17-23204 (E) 261217

Please recycle

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the ballistic missile launch conducted by the DPRK on 28 November 2017 in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council's resolutions;

2. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation, shall immediately suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on all missile launches; shall immediately abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon any other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

Designations

3. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and *decides* further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;

Sectoral

4. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles and whether or not originating in their territories, of all crude oil, unless the Committee approves in advance on a case-by-case basis a shipment of crude oil which is exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) or this resolution, further *decides* that this prohibition shall not apply with respect to crude oil that, for a period of twelve months after the date of adoption of this resolution, and for twelve months periods thereafter, does not exceed 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons in the aggregate per twelve month period, and *decides* that all Member States providing crude oil shall provide a report to the Committee every 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution of the amount of crude oil provided to the DPRK;

5. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all refined petroleum products, *decides* that the DPRK shall not procure such products, *further decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to procurement by the DPRK or the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles, and whether or not originating in their territories, of refined petroleum products, including diesel and kerosene, in the aggregate amount of up to 500,000 barrels during a period of twelve months beginning on January 1, 2018, and for twelve month periods thereafter, provided that (a) the Member State notifies the Committee every thirty days of the amount of such supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK of refined petroleum products along with information about all the parties to the transaction, (b) the supply, sale, or transfer of refined petroleum products involve no individuals or entities that are associated with

the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution, including designated individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, directly or indirectly, or individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions, and (c) the supply, sale, or transfer of refined petroleum products are exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) or this resolution, *directs* the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached, also *directs* the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 90 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached, and *further directs* the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached and to inform them that they must immediately cease selling, supplying, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year, *directs* the Committee to make publicly available on its website the total amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK by month and by source country, *directs* the Committee to update this information on a real-time basis as it receives notifications from Member States, *calls upon* all Member States to regularly review this website to comply with the annual limits for refined petroleum products established by this provision beginning on 1 January 2018, *directs* the Panel of Experts to closely monitor the implementation efforts of all Member States to provide assistance and ensure full and global compliance, and *requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect and provide additional resources in this regard;

6. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, food and agricultural products (HS codes 12, 08, 07), machinery (HS code 84), electrical equipment (HS code 85), earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia (HS code 25), wood (HS code 44), and vessels (HS code 89), and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of the above-mentioned commodities and products from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, *clarifies* that the full sectoral ban on seafood in paragraph 9 of resolution 2371 (2017) prohibits the DPRK from selling or transferring, directly or indirectly, fishing rights, and *further decides* that for sales of and transactions involving all commodities and products from the DPRK whose transfer, supply, or sale by the DPRK are prohibited by this paragraph and for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may only allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 30 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 45 days after the date of adoption of this resolution;

7. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles and whether or not originating in their territories, of all industrial machinery (HS codes 84 and 85), transportation vehicles (HS codes 86 through 89), and iron, steel, and other metals

(HS codes 72 through 83) and *further decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R-RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300);

8. *Expresses concern* that DPRK nationals continue to work in other States for the purpose of generating foreign export earnings that the DPRK uses to support its prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile programs despite the adoption of paragraph 17 of resolution 2375 (2017), *decides* that Member States shall repatriate to the DPRK all DPRK nationals earning income in that Member State's jurisdiction and all DPRK government safety oversight attaches monitoring DPRK workers abroad immediately but no later than 24 months from the date of adoption of this resolution unless the Member State determines that a DPRK national is a national of that Member State or a DPRK national whose repatriation is prohibited, subject to applicable national and international law, including international refugee law and international human rights law, and the United Nations Headquarters Agreement and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and *further decides* that all Member States shall provide a midterm report by 15 months from the date of adoption of this resolution of all DPRK nationals earning income in that Member State's jurisdiction that were repatriated over the 12 month period starting from the date of adoption of this resolution, including an explanation of why less than half of such DPRK nationals were repatriated by the end of that 12 month period if applicable, and all Member States shall provide final reports by 27 months from the date of adoption of this resolution;

Maritime Interdiction of Cargo Vessels

9. *Notes with great concern* that the DPRK is illicitly exporting coal and other prohibited items through deceptive maritime practices and obtaining petroleum illegally through ship-to-ship transfers and *decides* that Member States shall seize, inspect, and freeze (impound) any vessel in their ports, and may seize, inspect, and freeze (impound) any vessel subject to its jurisdiction in its territorial waters, if the Member State has reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution, *encourages* Member States to consult with the flag States of relevant vessels once they are seized, inspected, and frozen (impounded), and *further decides* that, after six months from the date such vessels were frozen (impounded), this provision shall not apply if the Committee decides, on a case-by-case basis and upon request of a flag State, that adequate arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future violations of these resolutions;

10. *Decides* that when a Member State has information to suspect that the DPRK is attempting to supply, sell, transfer or procure, directly or indirectly, illicit cargo, that Member State may request additional maritime and shipping information from other relevant Member States, including to determine whether the item, commodity, or product in question originated from the DPRK, *further decides* that all Member States receiving such inquiries shall respond as promptly as possible to such requests in an appropriate manner, *decides* that the Committee, with the support of its Panel of Experts, shall facilitate timely coordination of such information requests through an expedited process, and *requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect and provide additional resources to the Committee and the Panel of Experts in this regard;

11. *Reaffirms* paragraph 22 of resolution 2321 (2016) and *decides* that each Member State shall prohibit its nationals, persons subject to its jurisdiction and entities incorporated in its territory or subject to its jurisdiction from providing insurance or re-insurance services to vessels it has reasonable grounds to believe were involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution, unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that the vessel is engaged in activities exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue or exclusively for humanitarian purposes;

12. *Reaffirms* paragraph 24 of resolution 2321 (2016) and *decides* that each Member State shall de-register any vessel it has reasonable grounds to believe was involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution and prohibit its nationals, persons subject to its jurisdiction and entities incorporated in its territory or subject to its jurisdiction from thereafter providing classification services to such a vessel except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis, and *further decides* that Member States shall not register any such vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State pursuant to this paragraph except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;

13. *Expresses concern* that DPRK-flagged, controlled, chartered, or operated vessels intentionally disregard requirements to operate their automatic identification systems (AIS) to evade UNSCR sanctions monitoring by turning off such systems to mask their full movement history and *calls upon* Member States to exercise enhanced vigilance with regards to such vessels conducting activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution;

14. *Recalls* paragraph 30 of resolution 2321 (2016) and *decides* that all Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any new or used vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;

15. *Decides* that, if a Member State has information regarding the number, name, and registry of vessels encountered in its territory or on the high seas that are designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as subject to the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006), the various measures imposed by paragraph 12 of resolution 2321 (2016), the port entry ban imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 2371 (2017), or relevant measures in this resolution, then the Member State shall notify the Committee of this information and what measures were taken to carry out an inspection, an asset freeze and impoundment or other appropriate action as authorized by the relevant provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution;

16. *Decides* that the provisions of this resolution shall not apply with respect solely to the trans-shipment of Russia-origin coal to other countries through the Russia-DPRK Rajin-Khasan port and rail project, as permitted by paragraph 8 of resolution 2371 (2017) and paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017);

Sanctions Implementation

17. *Decides* that Member States shall report to the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the

Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, *requests* the Panel of Experts, in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;

18. *Calls upon* all Member States to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and this resolution and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions;

19. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and *further decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2345 (2017), shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;

20. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) or this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Development of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972;

21. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

22. *Emphasizes* that the measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and this resolution shall in no way impede the activities of diplomatic or consular missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations;

Political

23. *Reiterates* its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, *condemns* the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, *emphasizes* the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK, and *demands* that the DPRK stop diverting its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles at the cost of the people in the DPRK;

24. *Regrets* the DPRK's massive diversion of its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and a number of expensive ballistic missile

programs, *notes* the findings of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance that well over half of the people in the DPRK suffer from major insecurities in food and medical care, including a very large number of pregnant and lactating women and under-five children who are at risk of malnutrition and 41% of its total population who are undernourished, and, in this context, *expresses* deep concern at the grave hardship to which the people in the DPRK are subjected;

25. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and this resolution, and the work of international and non governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK, *stresses* the DPRK's primary responsibility and need to fully provide for the livelihood needs of people in the DPRK, and *decides* that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions;

26. *Reaffirms* its support for the Six Party Talks, *calls* for their resumption, and *reiterates* its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and the return of the DPRK to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards at an early date, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States parties to the NPT and underlining the need for all States parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other's sovereignty and exist peacefully together, that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;

27. *Reiterates* the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and *expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic, and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by the Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond;

28. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK's compliance, and, in this regard, *expresses its determination* to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch, and *decides* that, if the DPRK conducts a further nuclear test or a launch of a ballistic missile system capable of reaching intercontinental ranges or contributing to the development of a ballistic missile system capable of such ranges, then the Security Council will take action to restrict further the export to the DPRK of petroleum;

29. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

1. CH'OE SO'K MIN

   a. Description: Ch'oe So'k-min is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative. In 2016, Ch'oe So'k-min was the deputy representative at the Foreign Trade Bank branch office in that overseas location. He has been associated with cash transfers from that overseas Foreign Trade Bank office to banks affiliated with North Korean special organizations and Reconnaissance General Bureau operatives located overseas in an effort to evade sanctions.

   b. AKA: n.a.

   c. Identifiers: DOB: 25 July 1978; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

2. CHU HYO'K

   a. Description: Chu Hyo'k is a North Korean national who is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative.

   b. AKA: Ju Hyok

   c. Identifiers: DOB: 23 November 1986; Passport No. 836420186 issued 28 October 2016 expires 28 October 2021; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

3. KIM JONG SIK

   a. *Description*: A leading official guiding the DPRK's WMD development efforts. Serving as Deputy Director of the Workers' Party of Korea Munitions Industry Department.

   b. *A.K.A.*: Kim Cho'ng-sik

   c. *Identifiers*: YOB: between 1967 and 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male; Address: DPRK

4. KIM KYONG IL

   a. Description: Kim Kyong Il is a Foreign Trade Bank deputy chief representative in Libya.

   b. AKA: Kim Kyo'ng-il

   c. Identifiers: Location Libya; DOB: 01 August 1979; Passport No. 836210029; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

5. KIM TONG CHOL

   a. Description: Kim Tong Chol is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative.

   b. AKA: Kim Tong-ch'o'l

   c. Identifiers: DOB: 28 January 1966; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

6. KO CHOL MAN

   a. Description: Ko Chol Man is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative.

   b. AKA: Ko Ch'o'l-man

c. Identifiers: DOB: 30 September 1967; Passport No: 472420180; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

7. KU JA HYONG

a. Description: Ku Ja Hyong is a Foreign Trade Bank chief representative in Libya.

b. AKA: Ku Cha-hyo'ng

c. Identifiers: Location: Libya; DOB: 08 September 1957; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

8. MUN KYONG HWAN

a. Description: Mun Kyong Hwan is an overseas Bank of East Land representative.

b. AKA: Mun Kyo'ng-hwan

c. Identifiers: DOB: 22 August 1967; Passport No: 381120660 expires 25 March 2016; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

9. PAE WON UK

a. Description: Pae Won Uk is an overseas Daesong Bank representative.

b. AKA: Pae Wo'n-uk

c. Identifiers: DOB: 22 August 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male; Passport No: 472120208 expires 22 Feb 2017

10. PAK BONG NAM

a. Description: Pak Bong Nam is an overseas Ilsim International Bank representative.

b. AKA: Lui Wai Ming; Pak Pong Nam; Pak Pong-nam

c. Identifiers: DOB: 06 May 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

d. Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

11. PAK MUN IL

a. Description: Pak Mun Il is an overseas official of Korea Daesong Bank.

b. AKA: Pak Mun-il

c. Identifiers: DOB: 01 January 1965; Passport No: 563335509 expires 27 August 2018; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

12. RI CHUN HWAN

a. Description: Ri Chun Hwan is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative.

b. AKA: Ri Ch'un-hwan

c. Identifiers: DOB: 21 August 1957; Passport No: 563233049 expires 09 May 2018; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

13. RI CHUN SONG

a. Description: Ri Chun Song is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative.

b. AKA: Ri Ch'un-so'ng

c. Identifiers: DOB: 30 October 1965; Passport No. 654133553 expires 11 March 2019; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

14. RI PYONG CHUL

a. *Description:* Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of the Workers' Party of Korea and First Vice Director of the Munitions Industry Department

b. AKA 1: Ri Pyo'ng-ch'o'l

c. *Identifiers:* YOB: 1948; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male; Address: DPRK

15. RI SONG HYOK

a. Description: Ri Song Hyok is an overseas representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank and has reportedly established front companies to procure items and conduct financial transactions on behalf of North Korea

b. AKA: Li Cheng He

c. Identifiers: DOB: 19 March 1965; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

16. RI U'N SO'NG

a. Description: Ri U'n-so'ng is an overseas Korea Unification Development Bank representative

b. AKA: Ri Eun Song; Ri Un Song

c. Identifiers: DOB: 23 July 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

Annex II

Asset Freeze (Entities)

1. MINISTRY OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES (MPAF)

   a. *Description*: The Ministry of the People's Armed Forces manages the general administrative and logistical needs of the Korean People's Army.

   b. *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK.

United Nations S/2017/1093

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 December 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 5 December 2017 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan, containing an account of the Committee's activities from 1 January to 31 December 2017. The report, which was approved by the Committee, is being submitted in accordance with the note by the President of the Security Council of 29 March 1995 (S/1995/234).

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Fode **Seck**
Chair
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan

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S/2017/1065

Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan

I. Introduction

1. The present report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan covers the period from 1 January to 31 December 2017.

2. The Bureau consisted of Fode Seck (Senegal) as Chair and the representatives of Kazakhstan and Sweden as Vice-Chairs.

II. Background

3. By its resolution 2206 (2015), the Security Council established the Committee and imposed a travel ban and an asset freeze on individuals and entities designated by the Committee as engaging in a wide range of forms of behaviour that threatened the peace, security or stability of South Sudan. The Committee is tasked with, among other things, overseeing the implementation of the sanctions measures.

4. By the same resolution, the Security Council established a panel of five experts under the direction of the Committee. The Panel's mandate was renewed most recently in resolution 2353 (2017).

5. Further background information on the South Sudan sanctions regime can be found in previous annual reports of the Committee.

III. Summary of the activities of the Committee

6. The Committee met six times in informal consultations, on 18 January, 21 and 29 March, 28 July, 6 October and 15 November, in addition to conducting its work through written procedures. The Committee also held joint informal consultations, on 10 November, with the Security Council Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan and 1970 (2011) concerning Libya.

7. During the informal consultations held on 18 January, the Committee discussed the Chair's report of his visit to South Sudan, Ethiopia, the Sudan and Uganda from 10 to 19 December 2016.

8. During the informal consultations held on 21 March, the Committee received briefings from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

9. During the informal consultations held on 29 March, the Committee heard a presentation by the Panel of Experts on South Sudan on the Panel's final report, submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 (d) of resolution 2290 (2016) (S/2017/326), and discussed the recommendations contained therein.

10. During the informal consultations held on 28 July, the Committee heard a presentation by the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on the Panel's work programme.

11. During the informal consultations held on 6 October, the Committee heard a presentation by the Panel of Experts on the Panel's 120-day report (S/2017/789), submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 2353 (2017).

12. During the joint informal consultations with the Security Council Committees established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan held on 10 November, the Committee heard briefings by the Panels of Experts on the Sudan, on Libya and on South Sudan and held interactive discussions, with a view to achieving a common approach on how best to prevent Darfuri armed groups in Libya and South Sudan from engaging in destabilizing activities.

13. During the informal consultations held on 15 November, the Committee heard a presentation by the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan on the Panel's interim report, submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 2353 (2017) (S/2017/979), and discussed the recommendations contained therein.

14. Following each of the above-mentioned informal consultations and in accordance with paragraph 104 of the note by the President of the Security Council dated 30 August 2017 (S/2017/507), the Committee issued press releases containing brief summaries of the informal consultations.

15. On 2 February, the Committee sent a note verbale to all Member States inviting them to recommend qualified individuals to serve on the Panel of Experts.

16. On 25 April, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Senegal briefed the Security Council on behalf of the Chair of the Committee regarding the final report of the Panel of Experts (S/2017/326) and the Committee's activities (S/PV.7930).

17. The Committee sent 37 communications to 12 Member States and other stakeholders, with reference to the implementation of the sanctions measures.

IV. Exemptions

18. Exemptions to the asset freeze are contained in paragraphs 13 to 15 of resolution 2206 (2015), as reaffirmed in paragraph 1 of resolution 2353 (2017).

19. Exemptions to the travel ban are contained in paragraph 11 of resolution 2206 (2015), as reaffirmed in paragraph 1 of resolution 2353 (2017).

20. The Committee received no requests for exemptions to the measures.

V. Sanctions list

21. The criteria for the designation of individuals and entities as subject to the travel ban and asset freeze are set out in paragraphs 6 to 8 of resolution 2206 (2015). The designation criteria were reaffirmed in paragraphs 8 to 10 of resolution 2290 (2016), which were in turn reaffirmed by paragraph 1 of resolution 2353 (2017). The procedures for requesting listing and delisting are described in the Committee's guidelines for the conduct of its work.

22. As at the end of the reporting period, there were six individuals on the sanctions list of the Committee.

VI. Panel of Experts

23. The final report of the Panel of Experts, submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 (d) of resolution 2290 (2016), was issued as a document of the Security Council on 13 April (S/2017/326).

24. On 11 July, following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2353 (2017) on 24 May, the Secretary-General appointed five individuals to serve on the Panel, with expertise in regional issues, armed groups, natural resources finance, humanitarian affairs and arms (see S/2017/594). The mandate of the Panel expires on 30 June 2018.

25. On 19 September, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 2353 (2017), which reaffirmed paragraph 12 (e) of resolution 2290 (2016), the Panel provided its 120-day report to the Security Council (S/2017/780).

26. The Panel conducted visits to Belgium, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Norway, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, the Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

27. In pursuance of its mandate, the Panel, through the Secretariat, sent 63 letters to Member States, the Committee and several international and national entities.

VII. Secretariat administrative and substantive support

28. The Security Council Affairs Division provided substantive and procedural support to the Chair and the members of the Committee. Advisory support was also provided to Member States to promote understanding of the sanctions regime and facilitate the implementation of the sanctions measures. Induction briefings were also provided to incoming members of the Council to familiarize them with the specific issues relevant to the sanctions regime.

29. To support the Committee in its recruitment of well-qualified experts to serve on sanctions monitoring groups, teams and panels, a note verbale was sent to all Member States on 11 December to request the nomination of qualified candidates for membership in the roster of experts. In addition, a note verbale was sent to all Member States on 2 February notifying them of upcoming vacancies on the Panel of Experts and providing information on recruitment timelines, areas of expertise and pertinent requirements.

30. The Division continued to provide support to the Panel of Experts, conducting an induction for newly appointed members and assisting in the preparation of the Panel's final report, submitted in April, and its interim report, submitted in September.

31. The Panel of Experts participated in the fifth annual inter-panel coordination workshop, held in New York on 5 and 6 December, organized by the Secretariat. On 7 and 8 December, the Division, in cooperation with United Nations system partners, conducted a workshop on investigative interview techniques for 10 experts from sanctions monitoring groups, teams and panels. One member of the Panel participated therein.

32. The Secretariat continued to update and maintain the Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List and the Committee-specific sanctions lists in the six official languages and the three technical formats. Furthermore, the Secretariat implemented improvements concerning the effective utilization of and access to sanctions lists, including through the creation of links within list entries, as appropriate, to INTERPOL–United Nations Security Council Special Notices, as well as the development in English of the data model approved in 2011 by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as requested by the Council in paragraph 48 of resolution 2253 (2015).

United Nations S/2017/1094

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 December 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 12 December 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit a report of the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the status of the implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya (see annex). The report, dated 24 November 2017, covers the period from 23 October to 22 November 2017.

The report was prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-52/DEC.1 of 20 July 2016 and Security Council resolution 2298 (2016) of 22 July 2016, for transmission to the Security Council.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) António **Guterres**

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Annex

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my report entitled "Status of the implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya", prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of decision EC-M-52/DEC.1 of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, dated 20 July 2016, and Security Council resolution 2298 (2016), dated 22 July 2016, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 23 October 2017 to 22 November 2017 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-52/DEC.2, dated 27 July 2016, and EC-M-53/DEC.1, dated 26 August 2016.

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Report by the Director General

Status of the Implementation of the Plan for the Destruction of Libya's Remaining Category 2 Chemical Weapons Outside the Territory of Libya

1. At its Fifty-Second Meeting, the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") adopted a decision on the "Destruction of Libya's Remaining Chemical Weapons" (EC-M-52/DEC.1, dated 20 July 2016) and requested the Director-General to assist Libya in developing a modified plan of destruction of Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons. On 22 July 2016, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2298 (2016), welcoming and endorsing the decision by the Council and requesting the Director-General, through the Secretary-General, to report to the Security Council on a regular basis until the destruction is complete and verified.

2. At the conclusion of its Fifty-Second Meeting, the Council adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Libya's Remaining Category 2 Chemical Weapons" (EC-M-52/DEC.2, dated 27 July 2016). In operative paragraph 17 of that decision, the Council requested the Director-General to report to the Council on a monthly basis on the implementation of the decision. This fifteenth monthly report covers the period from 23 October to 22 November 2017.

Progress in the elimination of Libyan chemical weapons by the State Party hosting destruction activities

3. Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von chemischen Kampfstoffen und Rüstungsaltlasten mbH (GEKA mbH), the designated destruction facility at Munster, Germany, completed the destruction of the 2-chloroethanol and tributylamine on 17 December 2016 and 20 January 2017, respectively. The destruction of thionyl chloride was completed on 10 September 2017.

4. As previously reported (EC-85/DG.1, dated 23 March 2017), the destruction of phosphorous trichloride by incineration was suspended as a necessary precaution in order to prevent the refractory coating from severe damage. Destruction by neutralisation began on 12 September 2017. As at 20 November, 109.9 metric tonnes (MT), or 96.7%, of the phosphorous trichloride had been destroyed.

5. Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") teams, along with Libyan observers, continue to inspect GEKA mbH every two months, with the last such inspection having been conducted from 12 to 15 September 2017. No issues were encountered with the destruction process.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to Libya

6. The Secretariat inspected the destruction operations at GEKA mbH and reviewed the neutralisation of phosphorous trichloride during the aforementioned inspection. The Secretariat was able to witness sampling and analysis of the reaction mass in order to confirm completion of destruction. The inspection team verified the completion of the destruction of thionyl chloride and the ongoing destruction of phosphorous trichloride through on-site confirmation and review of video recordings.

7. The next inspection at GEKA mbH is scheduled to take place from 4 to 7 December 2017. The Secretariat will continue to assess the verification procedures

for the neutralisation process and confirm the destruction since the last inspection. It is anticipated that destruction activities will be completed during the inspection and the Secretariat will generate a final inspection report.

8. As previously reported, the Secretariat was informed that during decanting operations at the Ruwagha storage facility, one container experienced an exothermic reaction, causing the material inside to polymerise. Through an agreement with the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), destruction of the contents of the remaining container began on 25 July and was completed on 7 August 2017. The Secretariat has confirmed the destruction of the contents of the container.

9. On 29 August 2017, the Secretariat received a letter from His Excellency Mr. Mohamed Siala, the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, noting the approaching completion of its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and inviting the Secretariat to send an inspection team to Libya. On 19 September 2017, the Director-General informed Minister Siala that the Secretariat was in touch with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security regarding updates to the security situation in Libya. Further to this point, the Director-General noted that the Secretariat is working closely with the Libyan National Authority to develop a plan that would allow the Secretariat to comply with the report of the Council at its Eighty-Third Session (paragraph 6.12 of EC-83/5, dated 11 November 2016), requesting soil samples from Ruwagha.

10. On 20 September 2017, the Director-General wrote to the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, requesting an assessment of the feasibility of an inspection team traveling to Ruwagha. For further consideration, on 20 September 2017, the Director-General transmitted a letter to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Mr. Ghassan Salame, informing him of the correspondence from the Libyan Foreign Minister and seeking assistance from UNSMIL in the event of a mission to Ruwagha.

11. On 17 October, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security replied to the Director-General, noting that the Ruwagha chemical facility is located in the central province of Al-Jufra, which is currently controlled by the Libyan National Army. A "no-fly zone" has been imposed over this region and the United Nations has not been able to obtain clearance for a flight into the area in the last 18 months. The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security recommended that the OPCW first conduct an assessment visit to Tripoli, in order to discuss access to the Ruwagha facility with the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, security authorities, and UNSMIL.

12. A Secretariat team travelled to Tripoli on 30 October to meet with representatives of UNSMIL and representatives of the Libyan Government to assess the viability of a mission to Ruwagha. Discussions revealed the lack of a support structure to provide adequate security for an OPCW team at this time. The Secretariat continues to evaluate options that would allow it to comply with paragraph 6.12 of EC-83/5.

Overall costs and status of the trust fund

13. On 1 August 2016, the Secretariat issued a Note calling for voluntary contributions to the trust fund for support to Libya (S/1400/2016, dated 1 August 2016). As at the cut-off date of this report, the trust fund had received over EUR 1.2 million, with contributions having been received from Canada, Cyprus, Finland, New Zealand, and the United States of America. An additional EUR 133,638 was received from Canada in the form of a transfer of funds from a previous trust fund dedicated to Libya. Furthermore, the Secretariat received a

contribution of EUR 20,000 from Spain on 30 June 2017. As at the cut-off date of this report, expenses in the amount of EUR 829,438 had been charged to the trust fund for activities related to the destruction of Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons.

14. The trust fund continues to be used to fund destruction and verification activities related to Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons. The content of the remaining Category 2 chemical weapons container in Ruwagha was destroyed utilising funding from Cyprus, Finland, New Zealand, and Spain.

15. The Secretariat has been notified that the European Union will provide substantial funding for the clean-up operations of the Ruwagha Tank Farm, where 350 MT of highly acidic mustard hydrolysate is stored in corroded and leaking containers, along with other remnants from the former chemical weapons programme.

16. The Director-General would once again like to express his appreciation to those States Parties that have already made or have committed to making voluntary contributions to the trust fund.

United Nations S/2017/1095

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 December 2017

Original: English

Thirteenth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1956 (2010)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1956 (2010), in which the Council requested me to provide written reports to the Council every six months about the United Nations Compensation Fund, with effect from 1 January 2012, evaluating the continued compliance with the provisions of paragraph 21 of resolution 1483 (2003), which requires Iraq to deposit 5 per cent of the proceeds from export sales of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas into the Fund. The present thirteenth report covers the developments following the issuance of my twelfth report (S/2017/549) on 27 June 2017.

II. Developments

2. The overall amount of compensation paid to date by the United Nations Compensation Commission stands at $47.8 billion, leaving approximately $4.6 billion outstanding to be paid to Kuwait to settle the last remaining claim.

3. As indicated in my previous report, owing to the extraordinarily difficult security circumstances in Iraq and the unusual budgetary challenges associated therewith that had continued since the adoption of its decisions 272 (2014) and 273 (2015), the Governing Council of the Commission adopted decision 274 (2016), by which it postponed until 1 January 2018 the deposit requirements of Iraq under Security Council resolution 1483 (2003). As a result of those decisions, no compensation payments towards the outstanding award have been made since October 2014. In the light of the postponements, the Governing Council has been considering future options to ensure the payment of the outstanding amount in a timely manner.

4. At its eighty-third session, held on 5 October 2017, the Governing Council adopted decision 275 (2017), in which it called upon the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait to present options to the Council that would ensure the final payment of compensation by the end of 2021, to be considered at a special Council session on 21 November 2017.

5. At the special session, the Governing Council welcomed the receipt of a proposal for deposits to resume into the Compensation Fund in 2018 put forward by the Government of Iraq and accepted by the Government of Kuwait. The Council adopted decision 276 (2017), which provides for 0.5 per cent of oil proceeds to be deposited into the Fund in 2018, 1.5 per cent in 2019 and 3 per cent beginning in 2020.

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until such time as the outstanding compensation award has been paid in full. Based on current oil price and export projections, this would result in payment in full of the outstanding award, and the conclusion of the Commission's mandate, by the end of 2021. Under this decision, the Council also affirmed that the Commission should remain in place under its current arrangements unless the Council decided otherwise.

6. In conclusion, I note with appreciation the commitment of the Government of Iraq to fulfilling its compensation obligations and welcome the anticipated resumption of deposits to the Compensation Fund in 2018. I also acknowledge and thank the Government of Kuwait for its support for the postponements over the past three years, as well as its support for the reduction in the percentage of proceeds to be deposited into the Fund beginning in 2018.

United Nations S/2017/1086

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 December 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 20 December 2017 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as President of the Security Council, I am forwarding to you a letter dated 14 December 2017 from the Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, established by the Security Council in its resolution [illegible], based on the Working Group's conclusions adopted on 12 November 2017 [illegible] (see annex).

(Signed) Karin **Bessho**
President of the Security Council

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Annex

Letter dated 14 December 2017 from the Chair of the Working Group of the Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict addressed to the Secretary-General

At its 67th meeting, on 3 August 2017, the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict examined the first report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Nigeria (S/2017/304), covering the period from January 2013 to December 2016. At its 88th meeting, on 15 November 2017, the Working Group adopted its conclusions on children and armed conflict in Nigeria (S/AC.51/2017/7).

In follow-up to the recommendations of the Working Group and subject to and consistent with applicable international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011), 2068 (2012), 2143 (2014) and 2225 (2015), I am entrusted, in my capacity as Chair of the Working Group, with:

(a) Inviting you to ensure that the United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting strengthens its monitoring and reporting activities;

(b) Requesting you to ensure that the United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting continues its ongoing work and advocacy for the release and reintegration of children associated with armed groups and armed forces and continues its engagement with the Civilian Joint Task Force to develop and sign an action plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children.

(*Signed*) Olof **Skoog**
Chair
Security Council Working Group
on Children and Armed Conflict

United Nations S/2017/1097

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 December 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 21 December 2017 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014), containing an account of the Committee's activities from 1 January to 31 December 2017. The report, which was approved by the Committee, is being submitted in accordance with the note by the President of the Security Council of 29 March 1995 (S/1995/234).

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Koro **Bessho**
Chair
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014)

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Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014)

I. Introduction

1. The present report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) covers the period from 1 January to 31 December 2017.

2. The Bureau of the Committee consisted of Koro Bessho (Japan) as Chair and the representative of Ukraine as Vice-Chair.

II. Background

3. By its resolution 2140 (2014), the Security Council imposed an asset freeze and a travel ban, for an initial period of one year from the date of the adoption of the resolution (26 February 2014), on individuals and entities engaging in or providing support for acts that threatened the peace, security or stability of Yemen. Exemptions to the measures were also included. The Council established a committee to designate such individuals and entities and to oversee the implementation of the measures and a panel of experts to assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate. The Committee was also tasked with encouraging a dialogue between the Committee and interested Member States, in particular those in the region, and directed to cooperate with other relevant Council sanctions committees, in particular the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. On 7 November 2014, the Committee designated the former President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and two commanders of the Houthi Ansarallah movement as subject to the asset freeze and travel ban.

4. By its resolution 2216 (2015), the Security Council renewed the asset freeze and travel ban for a further period of one year and also imposed a targeted arms embargo against designated individuals and entities. Inspection provisions were included in the context of the enforcement of the arms embargo, including requirements with regard to reporting to the Committee by any Member State when it undertakes an inspection, and additional reporting if prohibited items for supply, sale or transfer are found. The Council broadened the designation criteria to include violations of the targeted arms embargo as well as obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemen or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Yemen. It designated the leader of the Houthi Ansarallah movement, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, and the former President's son, Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, as subject to the sanctions measures. The mandate of the Panel of Experts was also broadened to include monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo, and the size of the Panel increased from four experts to five as a result. By its resolution 2266 (2016), the Council further renewed the asset freeze and travel ban, as well as the mandate of the Panel of Experts.

5. The mandate of the Panel of Experts was most recently extended until 28 March 2018 by the Council in its resolution 2342 (2017), by which the Council also renewed until 26 February 2018 the asset freeze and travel ban.

6. Further background information on the Yemen sanctions regime can be found in the previous annual reports of the Committee.

III. Summary of the activities of the Committee

7. The Committee met four times in informal consultations, on 27 January, 18 April, 28 April and 31 July, in addition to conducting its work through written procedures.

8. During the informal consultations held on 27 January, the Committee heard a presentation by the Panel of Experts on its final report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2266 (2016), and discussed the recommendations contained therein.

9. During the informal consultations held on 18 April, the Committee heard a presentation by the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, the World Food Programme Country Director in Yemen and the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, on humanitarian access through Red Sea ports in Yemen.

10. During the informal consultations held on 28 April, the Committee heard a presentation by the Panel of Experts on its activities since the presentation of its final report for 2016 to the Committee and on its programme of work.

11. During the informal consultations held on 31 July, the Committee heard a presentation by the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on the Panel's midterm update, submitted in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2342 (2017), and discussed the recommendations contained therein.

12. On 8 March, the Committee amended its guidelines for the conduct of its work to reflect the provisions of resolution 2342 (2017).

13. On 29 March, pursuant to paragraph 19 (e) of resolution 2140 (2014), the Chair of the Committee briefed the Security Council on the activities of the Committee in consultations.

14. In 2017, the Committee received one implementation report from a Member State. Furthermore, the Committee received 30 inspection reports from the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen, established pursuant to resolution 2216 (2015).

15. The Committee sent 11 communications to Member States and other stakeholders with reference to the implementation of the sanctions measures.

IV. Exemptions

16. Exemptions to the asset freeze are outlined in paragraphs 12 to 14 of resolution 2140 (2014).

17. Exemptions to the travel ban are outlined in paragraph 16 of resolution 2140 (2014).

18. During the reporting period, the Committee received one notification for a payment in relation to a contract entered into prior to the listing of an individual, pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 2140 (2014).

V. Sanctions list

19. The criteria for the designation of individuals and entities as subject to the asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo are set out in paragraphs 17 and 18 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 (2015). The procedures for

requesting delisting are described in the Committee's guidelines for the conduct of its work.

20. As at the end of the reporting period, there were five individuals on the sanctions list of the Committee.

VI. Panel of Experts

21. On 27 January, in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2266 (2016), the Panel of Experts provided its final report to the Committee (S/2017/81), which was transmitted to the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

22. On 23 March, following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2342 (2017) on 23 February, the Secretary-General appointed four experts to the Panel, with expertise in arms, finance, international humanitarian law and regional issues (see S/2017/245). On 13 April, a fifth expert was also appointed to the Panel with expertise in armed groups (see S/2017/324). The mandate of the Panel expires on 28 March 2018.

23. On 31 July, in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2342 (2017), the Panel presented its midterm update to the Committee.

24. The Panel conducted visits to Belgium, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Jordan, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Yemen.

25. In pursuance of its mandate, the Panel of Experts, through the Secretariat, sent 203 letters to Member States, the Security Council, the Committee and international and national entities.

VII. Secretariat administrative and substantive support

26. The Security Council Affairs Division provided substantive and procedural support to the Chair and the members of the Committee. Advisory support was also provided to Member States to promote understanding of the sanctions regimes and facilitate the implementation of the sanctions measures. Induction briefings were also provided to incoming members of the Council to familiarize them with the specific issues relevant to the sanctions regime.

27. To support the Committee in its recruitment of well-qualified experts to serve on sanctions monitoring groups, teams and panels, a note verbale was sent to all Member States on 11 December to request the nomination of qualified candidates for membership of the roster of experts. In addition, a note verbale was sent to all Member States on 14 November notifying them of upcoming vacancies on the Panel of Experts and providing information on recruitment timelines, areas of expertise and pertinent requirements.

28. The Division continued to provide support to the Panel of Experts, conducting an induction for newly appointed members and assisting in the preparation of the Panel's final report submitted in January and during the preparation of its midterm update submitted in July.

29. The Panel participated in the fifth annual inter-panel coordination workshop, held in New York on 5 and 6 December, organized by the Secretariat. On 7 and 8 December, the Division, in cooperation with United Nations system partners,

conducted a workshop on investigative interview techniques for 10 experts from sanctions monitoring groups, teams and panels.

30. The Secretariat continued to update and maintain the Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List and the committee-specific sanctions lists in the six official languages and the three technical formats. Furthermore, the Secretariat implemented improvements concerning the effective utilization of and access to sanctions lists, including through the creation of links within list entries, as appropriate, to INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices, as well as the development in English of the data model approved in 2011 by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 48 of resolution 2253 (2015).